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Paul William Vogel, P.A. 
Attorney-at-Law 
120 East LakcStreel 
Suite313 
P.O. Box 1828 
Snndpoint, ID 83864.0903 
Ph: (208) 263-6636 
Fnx: (208) 265-6775 
PAUL WILLIAM VOGEL, P.A. 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
P.O. BOX 1828 
SANDPOINT, ID 83864 
PHONE (208) 263-6636 
FAX (208) 265-6775 
ISB NO. 2504 
2888 JAN I LI P 3: l I. 
ST,A...TE GF IDAHO 
COUWT'I OF KOUHDARY 
IN THE DlSTRlCT COURT OF THE FRST JUD 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE CO 
Petitioners, 
PATRICK GARDINER and ADA 
GARDWER, husband and wife, 
VS. 
CASE NO. CV-2006-339 
MEMORANDUM AND AFFIDAVIT RE: 
ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS 
BOUNDARY COUNTY BOARD OF 
COMMISSIONERS, 
Respondent. 1 
STATE OF IDAHO 1 
SS. 
County of Bonner 1 
Paul William Vogel, being duly sworn on oath, deposes and states as follows: 
1. Affiant submits this Memorandun1 and Affidavit Re: Attorney Fees and Costs 
pursuant to I.R.C.P. 54 and I.A.R. 40@). The attorney fees in this action were charged based on 
consideration of the following: 
A. The time and labor required. 
B. The novelty and difficulty of the questions of law involved therein. 
C. The skill requisite to perform the legal service properly and the 
experience and ability of Affiant in the particular field of law. 
MEMORANDUM AND AFFWAVIT RE: ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS - 1 \w 
/ / D. The prevailing charges for like work. 
!I E. The fact that the fee was based on Affiant's hourly rate. 
F. The results obtained. 
/ / G. The reasonable cost of coinputer assisted legal research. 
2. At the time these proceedings com~enced, in June, 2006, Affiant charged for his 
I I services the rate of $150.00 per how. This rate increased to $160.00 per hour in January, 2007. 
I I The hourly rate increased to $170.00 per hour in July, 2007. The rate increased to $180.00 per / / how commencing in January, 2008. 
1 1  3. Petitioners are entitled to recovery of attorney fees and costs pursuant to the / / Court's Memorandum Opinion and Order Setting Aside Special Use Permit. 
/ / 4. To the best of Affiant's knowledge and belief, the items contained below are 
1 I correct and the costs are claimed in compliance with the applicable rules set forth below. 
/ I M E M O W U M  AND AFFIDAVIT Rl3 ATORNW FEES AND COSTS - 2 
\* 






























Phone conference with clients; letter to clients 
Review letter from clients and Notice; messages for 
clients 
Review letter from clients; message for clients; letter 
to Topp 
Phone conference with Ada 
Review letter from clients, code section and ordinance 
Review letter from Topp to Dinning; letter to clients 
Phone conference with Ada; Tungsten is working 
today 













713 1/06 1 Review letter from Rohrwasser; letter to clients .10 150.00 
r I I 
SERVICE 
 
Phone conference with Douglas; message for clients 
Phone conference with Pat 
Legal research re: Regan v. Kootenai County 
Phone conference with Pat 
Phone conference with Ada 
Travel time to and from Bonners 
Attendance at Commissioners meeting 









8/10/06 / Letter to Rohrwasser .20 150.00 


















Phone conference with Pat; letter to Weland 
Travel time to and from Bonners 
Attendance at Commissioners meeting 
1/8/06 / Phone message for clients; revision of Petition .20 150.00 
I I I 












Review Takings Analysis Request; phone conference 
with Rohrwasser to request a copy of the Findings; 






Letter to Clerk; to Commissioners 
Review Order Governing Judicial Review; letter to 
clients 









1113106 1 Phone conference with clients .10 150.00 



























Review letter from Ada; phone conference with Pat; 
 
Preparation of Objection to Record 
Phone conference with Ada 
Review message from clients and 7-19-06 submission; 
message for clients 
Phone conference with Ada 
Revision of: Objection; letter to Rohnvasser 
Phone conference with Amy Bistline; with Pat; with 
Amy 
Phone conference with Ada re: attorney fees and cost 
issues; discuss briefing schedule 
Review stipulation and letter from BistI~ne; letter to 
Bistline; phone conference with Della re: 10-5-06 
filing error; phone conference with Michelle re: 
Amended Notice; phone conference with Pat 
Conference with clients; preparation of Objection; 
letter to Rohrwasser; to Topp; preparation of 
stipulation 















I I I 
.20 





/ / MEMORANDUM AND AFFIDAVIT RE: ATT RNEY FEES AND COSTS - 4 \%4 
150.00 
I 
Phone conference with Tammy re: she wants to talk to 
John about all this before Jack takes action 
11/10/06 
Phone conference with Pat; with Tarnmy at Douglas's 
office; letter to Bistline ----
.10 




/ /  / 11/14/06 1 Review letter from Bistline; letter to Douglas .10 150.00 
I I 
DATE SERVICE 
1 / ( 11/16/06 1 Letter to Clerk to Bistline and Topp 1 0  
I 





Review letter from clients and enclosure; letters to 
client; to To= and Bistline; preparation of stipulation 
12/4/06 
12/5/06 






/ / 1 1/22/07 1 Phone conference with Ada .I0 160.00 
I I 
.20 
Conference with clients re: settling the record 
Phone conference with Hull re: record; he has all 
objections and will file a notice once record is settled 
150.00 
Phone conference with client re: proposed 
amendments to Comp Plan and her desire to proceed 
without delay 
Phone conference with Topp; run everything through 
Hull 
Phone conference with clients; letter to clients 











/ I  I 
/ /  / 4/10/07 1 Phone conference with clients .10 160.00 





Phone conference with Hull's secretary; review file; 
fax letter to Hull 





Phone conference with clients. 
Phone conference with clients; with Hull; preparation 









Review clients' brief;  reparation of attorney fee 
section and conclusion 
160.00 
160.00 







6/4/07 I Review Hull's memorandum; letter to clients .60 160.00 
I I I 
HOURLY 
RATE 
Phone conference with Ada; message for Bistline 
Phone conference with clients 
5/22/07 
6/25/07 1 Phone conference with clients; need an extension .I0 160.00 
I I I 
Phone message for Hull; phone conference with Court 
Clerk; phone conference with Ada 
.10 
.20 
Phone conference with Hull; he hopes to have the brief 









I I I 
Review clients' brief 
7/26/07 
7130107 1 Phone conference with clients .I0 170.00 
I I 
I I 1 
Phone conference with clients 
7/30/07 
.70 
Review reply brief; phone conference with Ada; 
revision of brief; legal research re: substantial rights; 
phone conference with Ada re: Appendix 1 and the 
record; only mining portions were included 
160.00 
.10 
Phone message for Court Clerk; phone conference 
with Pat; message for Robnette; for Marshall; review 














Phone conference with clients re: intervention 
Review letter from Bistline; letter to Bistline 
.20 
Legal research re: Fox v. Boundaw Countv 











Phone conference with Judge Michaud and Robinson; 













Preparation of Oral Argument 
Court hearing re: Oral Argument 
Travel time to and &om Bonners 
Phone conference with legislative service 
Review legislative history; letter to clients 
Review Memorandum Opi~~ion; phone conference 
with clients 
Preparztion of Attorney Fee and Cost Memorandum 






l I 6. The following costs as a matter of right are submitted pursuant to 
I.R.C.P. 54(d)(l): 
ITEM 
Court filing fee for Petitioil for Judicial Review 
ITEM 
Certified copies of hearing transcripts, July 23,2006 and audio CD of 
hearing, certified copies of hearing minutes 
Certified copies of hearing transcripts, August 7,2006 







Certified copies of record beginning May 30,2006 
7. The following costs are aIIowed pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rule 40(b): 
55.00 
8. Petitioners seek discretionary costs pursuant to I.R.C.P. 54(d)(l)(D). 
I ITEM / AMOUNT 1 
A. Petitioner's expert witness fees paid to Kristine Uhlman, R.G. $5,000.00 I / 
B. Lexpert Research Services referral fee 
C. Air fare - expert's travel to Idaho to view property 
I TOTAL RE: EXPERT WITNESS 
Although this discretionary cost is not a cost as a matter of right under 
I.R.C.P. 54(d)(l)(C)(8); and although said cost exceeds $2,000.00, said cost should be 
awarded to Petitioners because Petitioners reduced legal fees in this matter by conducting their 
own research as set forth in paragraph 9 below. Petitioners are licensed attorneys in the State 
of California and devoted approximately 200 hours of time in research and Memorandum 
preparation in this case. Petitioners do not seek to recover for their time and the time they 
devoted to this matter results in direct savings to Respondent on the basis that, had Petitioners 
requested Affiant to do all the legal research, Affiant's attorney fees would be substantially in 
excess of those claimed above. Further, it is apparent from the record in this case that 
retention of an expert witness by Petitioners was reasonable and necessary under the 
circumstances of the case. 
9 ,  Petitioners incurred costs for automated legal research which are recoverable 
under I.R.C.P. 54(e)(3)(K). The initial research in this case was conducted by Petitioners. 
Affiant reviewed cases located and briefed by Petitioners and, as a result thereof, Affiant did 
not incur any direct legal research costs. 
I MEMOIUJDUM AND AFFIDAVIT RE: FEES AND COSTS - 8 
Legal research costs are based on Petitioners' utilization of LexisNexis for the time 
period June 3, 2006 through December 31, 2007. The total cost for electronic research, 
sought to be recovered, is $8,114.00. ' Attached hereto and incorporated herein as Exhibit A 
are true and accurate copies of the computer assisted research bills charged by Lexis and paid 
by Petitioners. 
10. Summary. 
by the Affidavit of Petitioner, Ada Gardiner, dated January 9, 2008, attached hereto as 
Attorney fees 
Costs as a matter of right 
Costs as a matter of right 
Discretionary costs 
Automated legal research costs 
TOTAL 







Dated this 10th day of January, 2008. 1 
This Memorandum and Af'fidavit Re: Attorney Fees and Costs is supplemented 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 10th d y  of Ja,nuarpi, 2008 
1 1 MEMORANDUM AND AFFIDAVIT RE: ATTORNEY EES AND COSTS - 9 
\Q 6-l 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that on this 10th day of January, 2008, I delivered a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing MEMORANDUM AND MFIDAVIT RE: ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS 
via U.S. fmt class mail, postage prepaid, addressed to: 
Boundary County Prosecuting Attorney Phil ~obinson 
P.O. Box 1148 Bonner County Prosecuting Attome)) 
Bonners Ferry, ID 83805 P.O. Box 1486 
Sandpoint, ID 83864 
MEMORANDUM AND AFFJDAVIT RE: ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS - 10 
\q5 
!NVOlCE NO. \ 1HvOlcE DATF 
06063~2737 1 30-JUN.06 
B I L L I N ~  p E R l O O  01-JUN-06 - 30,JUN.OS 
US )L- TAX ID 611671842 
CIV(RDIw GO -8TPITIOn NUMBER lZfl97457RT 
r n ~  BRI\I)GTRGT NUMBER BT-767.2611$ I3Fm INQUIRIES R W D I H O  1)(16 I M C E  
p-6 CALL BL0282-PJWI AND PRESG 3" 
L CURRENT' PERIOD TOTAL 
EXHIBIT A - Page 1 
INVGfCE TO: 
hmii'V6fE ADA GARDINER 
EARDINER LAW FIRM 
HC tso Bax 226 
PORTHILL LO 838539701 
UNITED STATES 




EXHfBlT A - Page 2 
c ~ e x i  s N exi s* 
- 
0607311(118 k-JUL- 
B I L L I N G  PERIOD 01- JUL-06 - 31-JUL-06 ""& 
"F, E l i " .  
" ,.---,n- ?,- .; ,-:,-. , . - ..- -. 
. ADA QARDlNER 
GARDINER LAW FIRM 
HC 60 BOX 228 
PORTHILL ID 61863-9701 
UNITED STATES 
XNVO1 CE No. I I R V U I C E  DATE 
0608349809 1 31- AU@-06 
'FUR INWlRlB R E M D I N G  THIS 1WMlCE 
PLEPSE C ~ V L  8mm.PS1 AND PREIS 3- 
ACCWHT NUMBER 
12QS9K 
EXHIBIT A - Page 3 
B I L L I N G  P E R I O D  01- AUG-06 - 31-AUG.06 
ACCWNT NUHBER 
!29S9K 
B I L L 1  NG PERIOD 01-5EP-06 - 3D-SEP-06 
C 6 0 S O X D J  
3RTHILL $5 838S-8701 
TENTID~J ADA CARDINER 
LY ACTXVITt  
-lAf@E& CREDITS AH0 TAX 
LMISNEXIS ONLINE CHARGES 
CONTR At7 CONTRACT CAP imu.E AHOLIN'I 
ALL SERYICES USE 8 PRlHT  $336.00 
BRGSS ADJOSTNEHT 
C611TRACT USE A ! w ! I  Am!u 
ALL S I R V I C E S  USE k P R I N T  . SVBTOTAl $0.00 $336.00 




'IOTM. LEXI  SHEXIS ONLl HE CHARGES 
CURREUT PERIOD CHARGES, CREDITS AND TAX TOT& 
PAYMENTS' 
16 SEP 2006: INVOICE: 0658949809 : 6527 ; $336.00) 
PAYMENT TOTAL 
*PAYMENTS I N  TRMSIT RAY NOT BE REFLECTED OH MIS STATEMENT 
EXHIBIT A - Page 4 
\q9 
1~~~~~~~ I INVOICE DATE 11 ACCOUNT NWeW 
&) u 8 H k a d s  I $1-DJY-00 II (2868K 0810315222 
BIIUMG PERIOD 01-061-68 - 31-OCT-06 
CURPER OH6 $SY.W ~,".~~~$E~@8ryfi:j6g74s~~i ,WT DUE USO $ZAEZW 
LEXISNE~~B 
PO WX 2511 p k y ~ ~ h ~ n ~ ~ 6 :  NET 10 DAY8 mON hE@lPi 
CAROL STREAM. 1L 60132-2314 
INVMCE IP; 
A n S T I O N :  PDA CARDINER ;%tgg jXRW FIRM 
pORTHIU ID 89863-81Q1 
UNil'EP STATES 
EXHIBIT A - Page 5 
!NVOlCE 10: 
ADA GARDINER 
GARDINER LAW FIRM 
ilc M) BSX 228 
?OKWILL ID  838558701 
UNITED STATE6 
-.p-y 
"..FOR IHW~RIES REGARDING TdIS I W C 6  
PLEPSE CALL Bmm.mP1 AND PRESS 1- 
I N V O I C E  RO. INVOlCE D A E  ACCOUNT NUMBER 
INVOICE SUMMARY 
DESCRIPTION 
LexisNexis5 6611316854 30-HOY-06 129S9K 
B I L L E U C  PERIOD 01-NOY-06 - 30-NOV-06 
ACCOUNT BALANCE 30-NOV.08 
I sqg r 536 -t- 189 
ACCOUNT BAhANCE 31QCT- 
CURRENT CHA'ES AND CREDITS 9 3 00 
CURRENT TAX '$8: OD 
TOTAL PAYMENTS RECEIVED 
PRIOR PERIOD CREDITS 
PRIOR PERIOD CREDIT TAX 
TOTAL ADJUSTMENT8 APPLIED 
!8:00! 
EXHIBIT A - Page 6 
$2,402.00 
t 3@: ;o", 
iX: 800 
LEXISSXIS ONLINE dl. RELATED CHARGES 




ALL SERVLCES USE 8 PRINT 
@ROSS ADJUtiTNEHT NET 
CONTRACT USE AMQ!m. AM!u.L AM!.w I 
ALL SERVICES USE 4 P R I N T  - g;:;%f $336.00 - 9UBTQTAL $617.01) 
INVOICE RO, 1 rnvor CE DATE 
- 
TOTAL L E X l S H E X l S  O H L I N E  6 RELATED CHARGES 
ACCOUNT HUWER 
CURREKT PERIW CHAUGES. CREDITS AND TAX TOTAL 
PAYHEUrS* 
19 CEC 2006: LNVOICE:  0511316854 : 4558 !5336.00) 
~ A Y H E N T  r o w  
*PAYMENTS IN THAIISIT MAT NOT B E  REFLECTED ON THIS STATEMENT 
LexisNexis5 
EXHIBIT A - Page 7 
aoa 
2 
061232D607 1 31.DEC.06 129S9K 
B ~ L L ~ N G  PERIoV O1.OEC-06 - 31,DEC-C6 
OlCE T . ! $ k m i L w  FIRM 
;G e4 BOX 228 
'ORTHILL ID 83553-9701 
ITIENTION: ADA GARDIHER 
CURRENT PERIOD C W G E S .  CREDITS AND TAX 
l H Y O I C E  SO. 1 IHYOICE DATE ACtOUWT NUNBEP 
LexisNexis~ 0701321343 131-JAN-07 
B I L L I N G  pERlOD 01-JAN-07 - 31-JAN-07 
lMVOlCE (BUMMARY 
- DESCRI PTI OH 
EXHIBIT A - Page 8 
t& Fhl)EWU TPKlD SZ.lQ71P42 
W l e W  DST RGGISTRATION NUMBER 123Y374S7R1 
m IU(D SRMSTREET NUMIISR Xl.781.286;X 
INVOlCE TO: 
ADA GARDINER 
GARDIHER LAW FIRM 
HC 60 @OX 
PORTHILL ID $3853-9701 
UNITED BTAES 
I)IVOICE DATE ' 
ES AND CREDITS 
ACCOUNT LIUWER 
229S9K @ LexisNexise 070231.1348 1 28-FEE-07 
B I L L I Y G  PERIOD 01-FEU-07 - 28-FEB-07 
INVOICE NO. 
OFOF! 1NQUIR)ES REOARDING THIS INkVlCE 
PLG,WE C.XU EW261.2381 ND P R D ~  a.- 
EXHIBIT A - Page 9 
GARDINER PRIME 0' '-'is P ~ G E  a2i06 BLi I37/28BS 15: 38 26E,?67 .?5 
-fu7 INQUIRIES R E W ~ I W  TH18 INVOICE 
-WIW~.DPI ~ b m m L ( *  
INVOICE NO. 1 IUYOICE DATE 
lNVBlCE SUMMARY 
ACCMlrlt  I I U M E R  
EXHIBIT A - Page 10 
(g) LexisNexis* 0704334174 1 30.APR-07 129S9K 
B I ~ L ~ U &  PERIOD 01-APR-07 30-APR-07 
iii, L'i12dJd i3 :  ># 2 ~ ; 2 ~ ( i i u 2 " i  CjAi?L,LN=K Yi.'.ll*lc (il'42Lb3 r*ui  Y > < i . i l  
ACCOUNT NUWEER 1UVl)tC.E NO, i N V O I C E  DATE 
B ~ L L ~ N G  ~ ~ ~ 1 0 0  01-KAY.07 - 31-MAY-01 
ATTENTION: ADA GARDINER 
MONTHLY ACT1 'f I T Y  
CURRENT PERIOD CHARGES. CREDITS AND Tb& 
L~~J(ISNEXI~ ONLINE & R E I A n D  t~ARw5 
CONTRACT CAP 
CONTRACT bMw.u &@Ki 
1336.00 ALL SERVICES USE 5 P R i H T  
GROSS A[IJus:HENT I 
GOHTRACT USE 7 . 0 0  
ALL SERVICES USE pa lNT ! SUBTOTAL - 
TOTAL CMITR~CT 1 WFDRMATIQn - 
TOTAL LEX[SNEXIS  ONLINE RELATE0 C"ARGEs 
CURRENT Q E R I O D  CHAR6ES, C R E D I T S  AND TAX 
Q  AYHENTS* : 4610 ($336. 00) 
21 MAY 2007: INVOICE: 0704334174 
p AyMEU'r TOTAL 
* p ~ Y ~ ~ ~ ~ ~  I N  TRANSIT HAY NOT BE REFLECTED ON THIS STATENUT 
EXHIBIT W - Page 11 
U1/87/2038 15: 38 ZBB167d825 GARDINER PRIME &%US PAGE a4 i06  
INVOICE SUMMARY 
DESCRIrnION 
Cu lUENl '  CHARGES AND CFSDITS 
C W N T  TAX 
TOTAL PAYMENTS RECEIVED 
PRIOR PERIOD CREDITS 
D CREDIT TAX 
LJSTMEMS APPLIED 
__ _ _ _ .,.. .,__._ _ _.,.--.--.-. - . .  . . .  -.,---- -- 
**DETACH AND R3TURN THIS PORTION WllX PAIX~NT*'  
EXHIBIT A - Page 12 
a3 
I 
A G C W  w#IBm 
W~QICEWD,  1 rnVoICEDATE 11 
al -~UL47 1msK ~ ~ ~ i s N e x i ~  0707-7 I - 
g L u N ~  PWim 07-JUM7 * s ' - ~ ~  
oS C P I I P O l ~ N C I S T F 9 ~ ~ & ~ ~ ~ 8 ~ ~  FEOERALIM ID 61-I~rl 1 2 ~ 3 ~ ~ ~ ~ '  ...mn l N D ~ i ~ l ~ ~  REEARDIWTIU~ ma 
,, , Uyl REV NUMBER B7-767-2883 PLEILSE tawsa"181 ANoPRESU~"' 
p;mmo~: ADA QARDINER 
WRDI~GR LAW FIRM 
M; gu &' .kt8 
pORMlll ID 8 w - 8 T 0 1  
Ibll'iEO 6TATE6 
EXHIBITA - Page 13 
LqEl-ii; .-..- -.~.a.m. _i_;;; .- ........... ?3e- 
$1 035.00 ;.j@;~dac&n-e~ , -- .?.!+!x ............ Fe@-~!.%-m*-~-=%@~ .- 7w2r =-A 
ss72~s 
;; B2~3gz;--.--.-.-..-.-.-." _L ..............._L........._L........._L.....-.._L..._L..._L...--._L....._L._L.-_L.._L.--..._L.--...-.-..-.-.-....-- slate Cwfi ................ Ca5Qs Cornhined .%=aZzZ .is- . L 3 ,  ... - 5 %!Y t <m .-..... s*-- :-e.ag ... 5 :szs ..... O d  ItfR - Dode of Federal Ugulatiom .. ? il=; &- $53.00 d r_ a d  - - - - -  g:~+ C- ~:=.<*.,=, r::$$::?t 
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Sub]: L8xisNexis - &aptamber 2007 invoice Notllloatlon 
3at91: 10/6/2007 10:30:46 P.M. Pacific Standard Time 
From: dnvol~c.notifi~alion @.l,~xisqe$s.cQm 
TO: adagardlner@aol.com 
To view your INVOICE for thls month's billing, or for any Online! 
Acmunt Management optlone, cllck on thrp foilowlng llnk to take you 
Into PowerInvoice'": 
Current accaunt information as of October 6, 2007 for 
GARQINER LAW FIRM. 
Account Number l 2WSK 
Involcs Nurnber 0709296271 
Invoice Date September 30, ZOO7 
Invoice Amount $SSS.OQ 
Account Bi+lance $JJ6.00 
you can BAY YOUR BALANCE ONLPAIE through the Powerlnvoice 
link abave, if you would like to send your payment through the mall, 
please prlnt your lnvolce ham Powerlnvoice and mall to the address 
indicated on the lnvoice statement. The Invoice statements are 
downloadable as a printable Image flle supported and viewable using 
Adobe Acrobat@. If you do not hove Adobe Acrobat@, please find a 
link to a fme downloadable flle at the end of thls e-mall. 
I f  you have quctstipns alwui your Invalce, please COntaCt 
LexisNexls at 1-800-262-2391, option 3, 
rf you wourd iike to contact your Account Managar, please contact 
LexisNexis a t  1-800-262-2391, option 2. 
Please add this domain @ernali.lexlsnexlsmaIIIcom to your Safe 
senders list. 
Adobe Acrobat@ free downloadable file avallabla at : 
h t t p : / / w w w . a d o b e , c o m / p r ~ d u c ~ a t r o b a r / r e t r n l  
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Monday, October IS, 2007 America Online: Adagardiner 
: , r . i r ; i  i :.mi !T  T~!<.(C, :rp,?!.%?qqr i t =  : q i  f i f i n x t n  '73 
Page 1 of 2 
Cubj: lnvoioa Notiticalion for Novembsr 2001 - LexisNexis 
Cwte. 12110/2007 10:42 34 P.M Pacif~c Standard Time 
To vlew your xNvQXCE for this month's blillng, or for any Online 
Account Management. options, click on the Following llnk to take you 
Into PowerInvolceTn: 
Current account information as of Deeember 11, 2007 far 
OWRDIHER Lnw PIRM. 
Account Number 1295SK 
Invoice Number 0712357569 
Invoice Date Movernkr 30, 2007 
Invoice Amount $?B@.QQ~ 
Account Balance f336.00 -. ... *.~ 
You can PAY YOUR BALANCE ONLPNIG through the PowerInvolce 
link above. If  you would llke to send your payment through the mall, 
please print your Invoice from PowerInvolce and mail to the address 
lndtcated on the invoice statement, The invoice statements are 
downloadable as a printable image flle supported and viewable using 
Adobe Acrobat@. I f  you do not h a w  Adobe Acrobat@, please find a 
link to a free downloadable File at the end of this e-mall, 
You can also prlnr this e-mail and send your payment Lo: 
LexieNaxis 
PO Bax 7247-7090 
Philsdelphla, PA 191150-9898 
I f  you have questlous a b u t  your invoice, please contact 
LexlsNexls a t  1-800-262-2391, option 3, 
If you would llke Lo contact your Account Managlar, pleem contact 
LexisNexis a t  1-800-262-2391, optlon 2,  
Please add thls domain @emali.lexlsnexlsm~lI~Com to Your safe' 
senders list. 
Adobe Acrobat@ free downloadable file available at : 
httr,://www.adobe.com/products/acrobat/readstep;Z.html 
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Thursday, Dccemba 13,2007 ~ h e r i o a  Online: Adagardiner 
7 ,-a 1 - c  :q~,+~! c~ I?>~M 31~118d 8 3 ~ 1 1 ~ ~ g  EZ8@LSZ%QZ TS :9T BiZBZ/LB/Xi 
@ LexisNexise 
Matthew Bender" 
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G4RDINER LAW OFRCE 
ADA QARDINER 
WRMtBOX22810WNST 
P a R M l U  ID 63863 
GARDINER LAW OFFICE 
APAOARDINER 
HCR 60 SOX 228 10 W I N  ST 
PORTHILL ID 83855 
Thank you fot YOUS o r d e ~ ,  we're oonfident you w i l l  find this t o  be a valuable I 
addition t o  your library. Please refex a l l  inqtiiries t o  our Customex ServiCaS 
Depazlnent. Our sesvicea aze avgilpbln Monday-Friday EAM-8PM EST. 
Phone (8003 833-3544, Fax [518] 487-3584, 
Authorized By:ADA rJlRDINER 
.- .---- - 
1 0820513032 2666.00 286.40- 2577.60 133 .00 128.88 2 879.  a8 
Servzce Psr iod:  01-06 06-07 ADRTCULTUSAL LAW FULL SET W/BVC 
Payment 01 mount Dua 2 3 6 . 6 2  
C P l L  YOUR ACCT MGR, JERXY COHEN. a'$ FOR INI"O,ABOOT OtlR PUBLYCATIONS 
" .------ r--r -------- -" cr=-",J" .z,7.sr. PPPPP.PPP.P---'- - - - -  --"-.----- ------- 
I 
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PAUL WILLIAM VOGEL, P.A. 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
P.O. BOX 1828 
SANDPOINT, ID 83864 
PHONE (208) 263-6636 
FAX (208) 265-6775 
ISB NO. 2504 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOUNDARY 
Petitioners, AFFIDAVIT OF ADA GARDWR 
PATRICK GARDINER and ADA 
GARDINER, husband and wife, 
BOUNDARY COUNTY BOARD OF 
COMMISSIONERS, 
CASE NO. CV-2006-339 
/ / Respondent. i 
I 
STATE OF WAHO 
SS. 
County of Boundary 
II Ada Gardiner, being duly swom on oath, deposes and states as follows: 
I I 1. Affiant submits this AfEdavit pursuant to I.R.C.P. 54 
/ I 2. Petitioner seeks recovery for the reasonable cost of automated legal research in 
the mount of $8,11400 
Paul William Vogel, P.A. 
Attorney-at-Law 
120 East Lake Street 
Suite 313 
P.O. Box 1828 
Sandpoint. ID 838660903 
Ph: (208) 263-6636 
Fax: (208) 265-1775 
3. My husband, Pat Gardiner, and I subscribed to LexisNexis electronic research 
to assist us in researching the legal issues involved in this case. Our contract was for $336.00 
per month so long as we did not exceed our parameters of Idaho and federal Ninth Circuit 
AFFIDAVIT OF ADA GARDWER - I aN EXHIBIT B - Page 1 
1 1  parameters. However, the research was for this case as follows: 
A. Restatement of property ($384.00); 
/ I  B. Business and corporation information ($175.00); 
1 1  C. Combined federal and state cases ($1,035.00); 
D. State court cases ($284.00); 
E. C.F.R. regulations (OSHA) ($53.00); 
! / F. Ninth Circuit federal and state cases ($135.00). 
1 1  4. We conducted legal research over a period of 18 months at a cost of $336.00 ( 1  per month, for $6,048.00. The additional casts total $2,066.00, for a total of $8,114.00 
Dated this ,?& day of January, 2008. 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 9 5  day of January, 2008. 
Notary Public for Idaho 
Residing at $8 u-ddeb, Z d  i+ h a w 
My Commission Expires: ,9-/8-// 
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JAN-24-2008-THU 01 : 39 PM BONl"rD LO. PROSECUTOR FAX No. 
BOUNDARY COUNTY C M L  ATTORNEY 
Philip W. Robinson (ISBN 1323) , 10833 JhN 2h p 1: 59 Po ]BOX 1405 
Sandpoint, Idaho 83864 
(208) 263-6714 
(208) 263-6726 (Fax) 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICLPJI DISTRICT OF THJ3 
STATE OF IDAHO, II\T AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOUNDARX 
PATRXCIC GARDINER and ADA 
GAW)WER, husband &d wife, 




B O r n A R Y  COUNTY BOARD OF 
COMES NOW, 1 3 0 ~ ~ Y  COUNTY BOARD OF COMNLISSIO~RS, the 
Respondent, by and through its attorney, Phil Robinson, and hereby objects to 
attorney fees and costs,submitted to the Court, pursuant t o  IRCP 54 and moves this 
Coat. ta disallow part or all attorney fees and costs stated in the Respondent's 
Memorandum and MEdavit Re: Attorney Fees and Costs. Petitioner objects to the 
OBJECTXON TO A T T O W Y  FEES 
AND COSTS 
amount of fees and costs as foIIows. 
SpecificalIy,'Petitioner objeck to the time axpended.by Respondents' 
attorney, Mr. Vogel. Petitioner does not doubt Mr. VogeI's time keeping only that 
the efforts put forth by Mr. Vogel were necessary., As stated in the Court's 
OBJECTTOLJ TO FEES- 1 
JAN-24-2008-TBU 0 1 : 39 PM BONWR CO. PROSECUTOR FAX N o ,  
Memorandum and Opinion, the boundary county subdivision ordinance 99-06, 
chapter 7, pertaining to special use permits is void. Therefore, Respondents or Nr. 
Vogel could have simply fled a Petition for Declaratory Judgment. If that avenue 
had been taken by the Respondents the attorney's fees would have been 
considerably less. 
The total expert fees should not be allowed. They are far above the allowed 
amount of Two Thousand Dollars ($2000.00) Furthermore, these fees are 
unreasonably and extremely high for the services needed and even the services 
performed by Ms. Uhlman. MB. Uhlmao was never even required t o  testify before 
the B o d  of Commissioners. She simply submitted a short report, Petitioner 
objects Lo the Lexpert Research services referral fee of One Thousand TWO Hundred 
P i  Dollars ($1250.00). The Petitioners, well educated attorneys, should have 
been able to k d  an expert through other less expensive means or for a lesser fee. 
Petitioners argue that they should be given a greater allowance for 
discretionaqy fees since as licensed attorneys they did not biU for their some Two 
Hundred (200) hours of work on their own case. As they are not licensed in the 
state, have not filed forpro h c  vice status, and have not entered a notice of 
appearance in this Court, they are not entitled to attorneys fees. They are not 
entitled to attorneys fees, whether disguised as discretionary costs or not. 
The Petitioner also objects to the research fees of Eight Thousand One 
Huadred Fourteen Dollars ($8,114). According to IRCP 54(e)(3)(K), research fees 
are classified as part of attorney fees m d  as petitioners are not licensed attorneys 
in the state of Idaho they are not entitled to the recover legal research fees. Even if 
the Court finds that they are entitled to some research fees, these fees are excessive, 
unreasonable and unnecessary. The tax payers of Boundary County should not be 
required to fund the legal research of the petitioners on their own case. While eight 
thousand dollars may be reasonable in California for legal research, it is not in 
Boundary County, Idaho. Furthermore, with the internet available, most case law 
OBYECTXON TO FEES- 2 
JAN-24-2008-THU 01 : 39 PM BONWER CO. PROSECUTOR FAX No. 
is adlable  for free on each stake's web site. The relevant cases cited by the Court 
were almost solely from the Idaho Supreme Court and Court of Appeals. 
Responaent respectifidly requests argument on these issues. 
Attorney for Respondent 
C E R r n C A r n  OF DELIVERY 
I hereby c e r t i f y  t h a t  on t h e  2qth day of January, 2005, I caused t o  be 
served a t r u e  and cor rec t  copy of t h e  foregoing document as addressed t o  t h e  
following: 
OBJECTION TO FEES- 3 
Paul William Vogel, P.A. 
Attorney-at-Law 
120 East Lake Stren 
Suite 313 
P.O. Box 1828 
Sandpoint. ID 838640903 
Ph: (208) 263-6636 
Fax: (208) 265-6775 
PAUL WILLJAM VOGEL, P.A. 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
P.O. BOX 1828 
SANDPOINT, ID 83864 
PHONE (208) 263-6636 
FAX (208) 265-6775 
ISB NO. 2504 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THFi FRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOUNDARY 
PATRICK GARDINER and ADA 
GARDINER, husband and wife, 
Petitioners, 
VS. 
CASE NO. CV-2006-339 
MEMORANDUM AND ARGUMENT IN 
SUPPORT OF PETITIONERS' FEE AND 
COST MEMORANDUM 
BOUNDARY COUNTY BOARD OF 
COMMISSIONERS, 
Respondent. I 
Patrick Cardiner and Ada Gardiner, husband and wife, through their attorney, Paul 
William Vogel, hereby submit this Memorandum and Argument in Support of Petitioners' Fee 
and Cost Memorandum. This Argument is based on the files and pleadings herein, together with 
the Declaration of Ada Gardiner dated January 23, 2008, attached hereto and incorporated 
herein. 
The sole purpose of petitioners' contract with Lexis was to prepare for this case. They 
had no contract with Lexis or any other automated legal research service prior to these 
proceedings. They are retired from their California law practice, do not practice law in Idaho, 
MEMORANDUM AND ARGUMENT IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONERS' FEE AND COST MEMORANDUM - I 
and had no need for this service except to prepare for this case. The Gardiiers contracted for the 
most minimal cost service that would be adequate to prepare for this case, which service was 
limited to Idaho law and Federal Ninth Circuit cases. 
The Gardiners are attorneys in good standing, members of the California State Bar, and 
admitted to practice in the federal courts and courts of appeal, and in the United States Supreme 
Court. They are trained and experienced in automated legal research. They used the research 
service to efficiently assist my office in the preparation of their case. They have not charged 
anything for their time spent on research. 
Automated legal research was necessary, given that the respondent is a government 
agency with its own legal staff with virtually udimited resources for litigation and research, 
especially considering the fact that the County does not have to pay an hourly rate for legal 
services. 
Given the number of hearings that were involved, the documentary evidence, the large 
admiistrative record, and the breadth of public issues in this case, legal research was necessary. 
Although it was necessary to exceed the basic, monthly p m e t e r s  to research certain 
issues, the agency's actions involved all of the issues researched outside of the basic service 
provided. For example, the basic service did not include federal statutes such as OSHA, federal 
mining, clean air and environmental laws or Supreme Court decisions on the subject of equal 
protection, condemnation and government takings of property. Particularly, since Idaho law 
provides for requests for takings analysis as a relatively new administrative remedy to claims 
involving the effect of government actions on private property, it was necessary to research these 
areas. 
MEMORANDUM AND ARGUMENT W SUPPORT OF PETITIONERS' FEE AND COST MEMORANDUM - 2 
as0 
The only reason OSHA became an issue was because the Commissioners put it in issue. 
They relied on 29 C.F.R., subpart U, as a condition of mitigation in its decision granting the 
special use permit. The County did not provide a copy of the regulations to anyone or explain 
how those regulations assisted adjacent property owners. In fact, the regulation did not relate to 
adjacent owners and, without the legal research, my clients would have simply had to accept the 
erroneous statements of the Zoning Administrator. 
It was only through a review of OSHA regulations that my clients were able to determine 
that there was no evidence supporting the County's proposition that OSHA protected adjacent 
property owners' property underground water from blasting in Tungsten's gravel pit. The 
research revealed that: the regulations were not cited correctly, and that there is no 29 C.F.R. 
subpart U. The proper citation is 29 C.F.R. (labor, ch. XVII (OSHA), part 1926.900 (safety and 
health regulations for construction), subpart U (blasting and the use of explosives). The 
@roper cite required extra time to locate and there are no OSHA provisions concerning 
precautions for safety to adjacent properties or water resources. 
OSHA, a workplace safety statute, has nothing to do with adjacent property rights or 
property owners, or safe blasting practices. Furthermore, OSHA does not require blasters to be 
qualified. 
This research was important because it clearly demonstrated that the Commissioners did 
not know or understand OSHA regulations, had no knowledge whether or not they applied to the 
Gardiners' property concerns, and were not concerned about their lack of such knowledge. 
Accordingly, this research supported Petitioners' contention that the decision was arbitrary and 
capricious. 
MEMORANDUM AND ARGUMENT IN SUPPORT OF PETrf'IONfZKS' FEE AND COST MEMORANDUM - 3 aa\ 
Sound and thorough legal research was critical because this case concerned government 
action and the abuse of government power over individuals subject to the government's 
jurisdiction. Individuals would be deterred from pursuing meritorious claims against 
government agencies if they are prevented from access to the same automated legal research that 
attorneys for government agencies routinely access. If governments are allowed to escape the 
costs of automated legal research of successful challenges to their decisions, this would have the 
undesirable effect of encouraging government abuse. 
The Gardiners shodd also be able to recover their expert witness fees. If the County had 
properly applied the burden of persuasion to the applicant, the Commissioners could and should 
have required Tungsten to present expert evidence that the blasting, crushing, and trucking 
activities associated with this gravel pit would not injure adjacent properties or adversely impact 
current uses of surrounding properties. 
By tuming the burden of persuasion around and placing it on appellants, the 
Commissioners forced appellants to obtain an expert witness in an effort to, essentially, do the 
job that was required of Tungsten. In fact, Chairman Smith challenged the Gardiners by stating: 
Is there anythmg, do you have anything that says blasting can 
cause water to quit running, or is that just a fear that you have . . . 
because we have a comment here (from Rick Dinning, a non- 
expert) that said there was no affect . . . a11 I'm interested in is the 
fact. If there is some fact out there, or there is some 
documentation that says dynamiting can have an affect on 
somebody's water, then I'd like to hear it . . . the only thing I am 
hearing that we've had dynamiting . . . and there was no effects. 
So I have it one way, but I don't have it the other way. C.T. 
7/26/05 15:22-25 - 16:l-12. 
MEMORANDUM AND ARGUMENT IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONERS' FEE AND COST MEMORANDUM - 4 22a 
Based upon this comment, appellants obtained the services of a registered hydrologist 
who visited the site, studied the facts, and prepared a report that appellants submitted for the 
record in the July 26,2006 hearing. 
Since the Commissioners caused appellants to incur this expense, they should reimburse 
appellants in full. The expert's fees are reasonable for the time spent in physical inspection of 
the propelty, the study of the facts and preparation of a written opinion. It was contrary to the 
applicable burden of proof for Commissioners to require adjacent property owners, not the 
applicant development corporation, to incur the cost of an expert as a result of the corporation's 
application. Ordering payrslent of these costs would deter such misconduct in the future. 
Finally, it needs to be kept in mind that the purpose of 1.C. 12-1 17 is two-fold: to serve 
as a deterrent to groundless and illegal agency action; and to provide a remedy for persons who 
have borne unfair and unjustified financial burdens defending against groundless charges or 
attempting to correct mistakes agencies should never have made. Reardon v. City of Burley, 140 
Idaho 115 (2004). Both ofthese reasons apply in the instant case. 
At all stages of the proceedings, the County maintained that appellants' case was 
frivolous and without merit and refused to give appellants' arguments and evidence due 
consideration. This compelled appellants to research a wide variety of issues to prepare for the 
record and judicial review, including due process, procedural and substantive issues involving 
the Local Land Use Planning Act, spot zoning, takings analysis and issues, state water rights, 
state zoning and variance laws, state agency rules and regulations, state open meeting and 
competitive bidding laws, state and federal mining, environmental, safety and emissions 
standards and regulations and state and federal constitutional issues. 
MEMORANDUM AND ARGUMENT LN PETITIONERS' FEE AND COST MEMORANDUM - 5 
The Idaho Legislature, by enacting the LLUPA, placed a duty of reasoned decision- 
making in zoning cases on local and planning zoning cornmissions and, ultimately, the County 
Commissioners. Accordingly, the Legislature adopted a local administrative process that would 
quickly settle local land use disputes, de-clog the court system of such cases and minimize 
litigation costs overall. These purposes are thwarted when, as in the instant case, the County 
abandons its duty, fails to follow its ordinances and basically challenges the objectors to take it 
to court. Full costs and fees must be awarded to deter such arbitrary agency action and to 
provide a remedy to appellants who bore these costs to correct actions and mistakes the County 
never should have made. 
F' 
Dated this day of January, 2008. I I / 
1~ v i l l J  
PAUL WILI~AM VOGEL 
Attorney for Petitioners 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
i hereby certify that on this day of January, 2008, 1 delivered a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing MEMORANDUM AND ARGUMENT IN SUPPORT OF 
PETITIONERS' FEE AND COST MEMORANDUM as follows: 
VIA HAM) DELIVERY VIA FACSXMLLE DELIVERY 
Phil Robinson Louis Marshall 
Bonner County Prosecuting Attorney Bonner County Prosecutor's Office 
Courthouse Mail Fax: 263-6726 
VIA U.S. MAIL 
Boundary County Prosecuting Attorney 
P.O. Box 1148 
Bonners Feny, ID 83805 
MEMORAhDUM AND ARGUMENT IN SUPPORT F PETITIONERS' FEE AND COST MEMORANDUM - 6 
aaq 
DECLARATION OF ADA GARDINER 
I, Ada Gardiner, declare as follows: 
1. I am one of the appellants in this action. My husband, Patrick J. Gardiner, is the 
other appellant. 
2. I have personal knowledge of the facts stated herein, and if called as a witness 
could and would competently testify to these facts. 
3. I make this declaration in suppoit of appellants' affidavit re: attorney fees and 
costs. 
4. On July 5,2006, Patrick and I contracted with LexisNexis for automated legal 
research services at the cost of $336 per month. The sole purpose of this contract was to 
prepare for this case. 
5. Neither Patrick or I had any contract with LexisNexis or any other automated 
legal research service prior to these proceedings. 
6. Patrick and I are attorneys in good standing and members of the California State 
Bar. We are also admitted to practice in the federal courts and courts of appeal and in the 
United States Supreme Court. We are trained and experienced in automated legal 
research. 
7. Patrick and I reside in the State of Idaho. We retired fiom our California law 
practice, do not practice law in Idaho and have no current need for an automated legal 
research service except to prepare for this case. The monthly rate we received from Lexis 
was its small firm rate for research in one state (Idaho) and federal 9th circuit cases. This 
was the lowest cost service we could get that would be adequate to prepare for this case. 
8. Patrick and I used this research service exclusively to assist our attorney, Paul W. 
Vogel, in his preparation of our case. Neither Patrick nor I claiin any attorney fees for 
our time spent in such research. 
I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of Idaho that the 
foregoing is true and correct. 
Executed this 23'" day of January, 2008, at Porthill, Idaho. 
Ada Gardiner 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNER 
COURT MINUTES 
JUDGE: JAMES R MICHAUD CASE NO. CV-06-339 (BOUNDARY COUNTY CASE) 
REPORTER: ANNE MACMANUS DATE: 01-31-08 TIME: 03:30 PM 
CLERK: LINDA OPPELT CD: 08-1 6 
DIVISION: DISTRICT 
PATRICK GARDINER, ETAL vs BOUNDARY COUNTY BOARD OF 
COMMISSIONERS 
Plaintiff I Petitioner Defendant I Respondent 
Atty: PAUL VOGEL Atty: PHILIP ROBINSON 
SUBJECT OF PROCEEDINGS PETITIONER'S MEMORANDUM AND AFFIDAVIT RE: ATTORNEY 
FEES AND COSTS AND RESPONDENT'S OBJECTION 
INDEX SPEAKER PHASE OF CASE 
/ RECOVERED. 
210 I IN CONCLUSION. WE GAVE BOUNDARY COUNTY A BREAK. 





Present: 1 PAULVOGEL, PHILIP ROBINSON, LOUIS MARSHALL 
I DON'T HAVE COMPLETE FILE. CITES WHAT DOES HAVE. THAT IS ALL THE 
DOCUMENTS THAT PERTAIN TO THIS ISSUE? 
YES 
HOW TO PROCEED? ANY PROBLEM ABOUT HIM GOING FIRST? 
NO 
MR. ROBINSON SUGGESTS IF MY EFFORTS WERE NECESSARY. I HAD TO 




TOOK 3.3 HOURS TO WRITE THE BRIEF. I SERVED IN A CONSULTING 
POSITION. 
SOME COSTS ARE DISCRETIONARY. 8 ISSUES WERE TO BE DECIDED BY 
THE COURT AND 6 WERE IN FAVOR OF MY CLIENTS. THE $2000.00 CAP WAS 
EXCEEDED. 
LEGAL RESEARCH IS UNDER THE ATTORNEY SECTIOFJ. WE RESEARCHED 
















MOST THE WORK THEMSELVES. 
HAVE A ADDITIONAL CASE NALOR V. LATAH COUNTY. 
THIS IS TRYING TO ARGUE THE DECISION. NOT APPROPRIATE TO ARGUE 
LM 
THIS. 
MS. OLMAN IS NOT A LICENSE GEOLOGIST IN IDAHO BUT IN ARIZONA. SHE 
DID NOT TESTIFY ONLY FILED BRIEFS. 
CAP IS $2000.00. 1 DON'T SEE THAT. 
LEGAL RESEARCH $8114.00 IS TOO MUCH FOR RETIRED ATTORNEYS IN 
CASE NO. CV-06-339 DATE: 01-31-06 Page 1 of 2 
PV 
CALIFORNIA. EXPLAINS. 
SHOULD LOOK AT THE PREVIOUS 2 CASES. TALKS ABOUT CASES. 
MOST PEOPLE THINK THERE SHOULD HAVE BEEN A GRAVEL PIT BY 
PORTHILL. ADJUST THE AMOUNT OF FEES AND COSTS. 
WITH REGARD TO THE NAYLOR. THE DISTRICT COURT DENIED ATTORNEY 
FEES. NAYLOR WAS A STATE STATUTE NOT A COUNTY ORDINANCE LIKE 
CASE NO CV-06-339 
COURT MINUTES 
Page 2 of 2 
pE8- 13-200fj-WED 01 : 32 PM B@?'NFR CO. PROSECUTOR FAX NO. P. 001 
.<-L 
Bounaary corn# civilmom'p;y 
Philip H, l b b h ~ =  (ISB*-23) 
PO Box 1405 
S&dpoht, Id&o 83864 
(2'08) 263-6714 
(20%) 2636726 (Fax) 
lTV THE DIS'l'RIC71' @(PUHII'QPFTHE FIRST JUDICIAL DIbTRICL' 
OF 'lW STATE OF IDAEIO, IN AND FOR THE COUNlY OF BOUNDARY 
]Patrick Chrdke~,  dal. 1 
) Case No. eV-2006-0339 
Petitioners, 1 
1 
VS. 1 NOTICE OF APPEAL 
j 
330-ARY COUNTY, a political ) 
subdivision of the State of Idaho, acking ) 
through the County B o d  of 1 
C o ~ i o n e r s  1 
> 
: The above-named Petitioners Ada! and Patrick Gariliner.md their attorney, 
Paul VogeI PO BOX 1828, Sandpoht, ID 83864 the Honorable Jam& Michaud, District 
. . . . . . . Judge, Co*?~e,Mail S?-??d~olnt, !D 83964 ,and the Gvk.of the a~ope-e-nPtled .. . . . . . . .. , 
Cdtj-n' 
1. The above-named Appellant, Bomdary County (hereinafter "Cou11ty"), through 
~.~~~-~.,@.~&~~~&.of.Q-~.~~~~~~~,-app&sfrom.a-decisionmade.bp- ..... . .. 
the Honorable James Michaud, District Judge for the F h t  Judicial Distrid of .the 
State of lckho, b and for the County of BOW*, who entered his Decision on 
F E B -  13-2008-WED 01 : 33 PM Brh"4ER CO. PROSECUTOR FAX NO. .- P. 002 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  _  .................... . . . .  - .  . . . . . . .  
Appeal on the 3d day of ~anuary, 2008, improperly ovending a land-use 
decision of the Board of edunty Commissionem concerning the approval of a 
special use permit for a gravel pit, 
a. This appeal is taken from the ~ i s t c i d  Court of the First Jvdicial District of the 
State of Idaho, in aod for the County of Boundary. 
3. Tbis appeal is taken.to the Supreme Court of the Staee of Idaho ftom the 
Honorable James Michaud's Decision on Appeal WIG& determined that the 
County improperly granted a specid use permit for -. a gravel pit. Tbe COW'S 
Memorandum Opinion and Order Settlog Aside Specisll Use Permit was entemd 
on the 3rd day of January, 2008 at the Boundary County muah-, B o u n ~  
Comty, Idaho, by the fionorabfe Jmes MiChaud, District Judge presiding. 
4. The Couniyh the right to appeal to the Xdaho Supreme Court and the judgment 
or order described in p-aph 1 is an appealable older under and p~~~ to 
Rule 11(a)(2) I.&& in that the order referenced in paragraph I. is a hal order of 
&e District Court on judicial review reversing the decision of the Counw. 
5. A preliminary statement of the issues mi appeal are: 
A.   id the district court err in holding that, BarmaaPy County's 
.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . . .  %h&+isi& ~rdinanck 99-06, Chapter 7, pertaining to special use parnits is  
wid? 
B. Did the district wurt err, h iits determination that the County 
iinproperly shifted the burden of persuasion to &e Petitionem? 
... .... .... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  , .. - .............. - - .............. ... __ ..... ........... _ .  ......... 
C. Did the district court err in d e ~ ~ n g  the county's decision was 
arbitrary anrl capriudus because it Medto  comply wit$ I.C. 67-6535? 
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...... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  - . . . . . . . . .  - . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
D. 1s Boundary County O r h w  Zoning and Subdivision Ordinance 
99-06 in oof lc t  with Idaho Code 67-6512 and void on j;Es face?; and 
E. Didthe D i d  Court err in awarding attorneys fees and costs to 
the Petitioners? 
6. A reporter's trmcript of all orid arguments of the D i e t  Court is requested. 
7. Appellant Boundary County requests tbt the following donunents be included in 
the Court's record in addition to those automatidy iucluded under Rule 28, 
1.A-R,: the parties' mcrtiom, briefs and memorandum below with any briefs, 
memoranda and affidavits concankg all issues appealed &om herein should be 
included and dowed into the clerk's record. 
8. Icertiijr: 
k That a copy of this Notice of Appeal has been served on the 
Reporter. 
B. That the Appellant is exempt from paykgthe eslimated transcript 
fee because the Appellant is a g w m e n t d  entity, that being Boundary Cozuzty, 
Idaho. 
C. That the Appellant is exempt ftom paying the esiimated fee for the 
. . . . . .  . . . .  - . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
pkipiiation ofthe feGrd b&%e the appellant js a governmental entity, that 
being Boundary County, Idaho. 
D. That the A p p e h t  is exempt from paying the AppeUant filing fee 
because the aoppeuant is a governmental entity, that being Bomdary County, 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  .......................... ............. .................................. ............................... 
Idaho. 
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__ , .  _  , , ,_  . .  , ,  . . . .  . . , . ,, , . . . . . . . . . . .  . . . . .. . - ...... . . . . -  
E. That service has been made upon all patties requimdto be served pwsuant 
to Rule 20. 
/3 DATED t h i s  day of February, 
I hereby uziify that on this day of F e b m ,  2008, I causeam be served e 
m e  and oo~~ect copy ofthe foregoing as addressedto the following: 
Pad Vogel 
Attorney at Law 
PO Box 1828 
Sandpoint ID 83864 
jiiniG Mi&Ud -- 
D a d  Judge 
Courthouse Mdbox 
Glenda Poston, County Clerk 
Bomdary County 
Courthouse Mdlbox 
. . . . - . -, . - , . . 
I&O kpreme COG 
Atb: Stephen Kenyon 
Clerk ofthe Courts 
P.0. Box 83720 
Boise, ID 83720-0x01 
Paul William Vogel, PA. 
Attorney-at-Law 
120 East Lake Street 
Sutte 313 
P.O. Box 1828 
Sandpoint, ID 83864-0903 
Ph: (208) 263-6636 
Fax: (208) 265-6175 
1 PAUL WILLIAM VOGEL, P.A 
1 ATTORNEY AT LAW 
P.O. BOX 1828 
' SANDPOINT, ID 83864 
PHONE (208) 263-6636 
FAX (208) 265-6775 
ISB NO. 2504 
IN TI% DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOUNDARY 
PATRICK GARDINER and ADA 
GARDINER, husband and wife, 
Petitioners, 
BOUNDARY COUNTY BOARD OF 
COMMISSIONERS, 
Respondent. 
CASE NO. CV-2006-339 
ATTORNEY FEE MEMORANDUM 
Court May Order Payment of Expert Witness Costs 
Incurred in Administrative Proceedings 
Courts may award expert witness fees in administrative proceedings pursuant to 
I.C. 12-117(1). This provision states that unless otlierwise provided by statute, the court 
"shall award the prevailing party reasonable attorney fees, witness fees and reasonable 
expenses" in "any administrative proceeding or civil judicial proceeding involving as 
adverse parties. . . a county. . . and a person," if the courts finds that the party against 
whom the judgment was rendered "acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law." This 
statute which is specific to county administrative proceedings makes such awards 
ma~ldatory. 
Additionally, appellants may be awarded expert witness costs under I.R.C.P. 
54(d)(l). See World Cup Ski Shop,Inc. v. Citv of Ketchm, 1 IS Idaho 294 (1990). In 
ATTORNEY FEE MEMORANDUM - 1 
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World Cup, the District Court awarded the full amount of expert witness costs that were 
incurred in a conditional use permit proceeding before a City Planning and Zoning 
Conunission. The full, requested amount of $1,500.00 was $1,000.00 in excess of the then 
$500 maximum expert witness cost authorized by I.R.C.P. 54(d)(l)(C)(8). 
The District Court had awarded the excess $1,000.00 portion under Rule 
54(d)(l)(D) providing that "additional items of cost not enumerated in, or in an amount in 
excess of [costs allowed as a matter of right] listed in subparagraph (C) may be allowed 
upon a showing that said costs were necessary and exceptional costs reasonably incurred, 
and should in the interest of justice be assessed against the adverse party." (Italics added.) 
Under this language, even if expert witness costs were not otherwise authorized under Rule 
54(d)(l)(C), such award is still proper as an "additional item of cost" under Rule 
54(d)(l)(D) according to the criteria in that provision. Conversely, even if expert witness 
costs are authorized by Rule 54(d)(l )(C), the court has discretion to award fees in excess of 
the maximum amount as "necessary and exceptional costs" under Rule 54(d)(l)(D). 
In World Cup, supra, the District Court had failed to make the findings in Rule 
54(d)(l)(D) supporting the $1,000.00 award. Because the record failed to provide 
adequate findings to explain the award, the Supreme Court could not discern whether the 
District Court abused its discretion in making the award. On this basis, the Supreme Court 
vacated the discretionary costs award and remanded it for reconsideration under Rule 
54(d)(l )(D) guidelines. World Cun supra, 118 Idaho at p. 296. Accordingly, the District 
Court may exercise its discretion to award expert witness costs in administrative 
proceedings under Rule 54(d)(l)(D), and the standard of review of such order and 
judgment is abuse of discretion. 
/I ATTORNEY FEE MEMORANDUM - 2 
The procedures followed in World CUP axe similar to the instant matter. The action 
commenced with an application to a City Planning and Zoning Commission for a 
conditional use permit, in that case for the purpose of expanding a bar near the Sun Valley 
Ski Resorl in Ketchum, Idaho. The Zoning Commission granted the permit over the 
objections of adjacent business owners. The business owners appealed to the City Council 
which affirmed the Zoning Commission's decision. The business owners then filed a 
petition for judicial review in District Court, and also sought a preliminary injunction 
agai~tst he proposed expansion. The District Court denied the petition and injunction, and 
awarded the bar owner the full amount of his expert witness fees under Rule 54(d)(1).' 
In Wo'orld Cup, the expert witness was an appraiser who had "offered testimony" 
about the effects of expanding the prevailing party's building. (World Cup, supra, 118 
Idaho, at 296.) The decision does not specify whether the appraiser actually testified, or 
whether the appraiser's offer of testimony was written or oral. It appears from this case 
and the public utility cases that written testimony is proper and typical in administrative 
proceedings and that awards for such costs do not depend on the form of testimony. 
This is co~~sistent with the Idaho Administrative Procedure Act, Idaho Code 
67-525 l(2) which states that "[alny part of the evidence may be received in written form if 
doing so will expedite the hearing without substantially prejudicing the interests of any 
party." Clearly, if expert witness fees could only be ordered as costs for experts who 
testify orally in the proceeding, the costs for expert witnesses would be substantially 
increased, and valuable agency, court time and public resources would be wasted. 
I The District Court also awarded attorney fees to the city and adjacent owners under I.C. 12-121. 
This award was vacated because attorney fees could not be awarded under that statute for cases initiated 
before an administrative agency. 
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Further, in R.T. Nahas Co. v. FIulet, 106 Idaho 37 (1984), the District Courl 
awarded costs to the prevailing party in a water rights case, including expert witness fees 
for a hydrologist/geologist as an extraordinary cost under LR.C.P 54(d)(i)(D). The District 
Court denied the non-prevailing party's motion to disallow costs, and made the required 
findings that the expert costs were: (1) actually incurred and paid; (2) clearly necessary 
and reasonably incurred, in that the expert's testimony was not only critical but of 
preemptive importance and value to the court in tlie determination of the matter; and (3) 
that justice demanded these exceptional costs should be assessed against the non-prevailing 
party. Id, 106 Idaho at p. 43. 
On appeal, the non-prevailing party argued that it was unfair to allow recovery of 
extraordinary costs in actions to adjudicate water rights. The Supreme Court found "no 
merit" in this argument because "[rlule 54(d)(l) does not indicate any limitations, as to the 
t,ype ofactions or costs, in its application. We are unpersuaded that the trial court abused 
its discretion in allowing recovery of the expert witness fee as a cost." R.T. Nahas Co., 
supra, 106 Idaho at p. 43 (italics added). While this case does not appear to involve an 
administrative proceeding, the Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether Rule 
54(d)(l) is limited to a specific type of action, and determined that it is not. It follows that 
administrative proceedings are not excluded from this statute. 
Of note, Idaho Appellate Rule 28(b) stales: "The clerk's or agency's record shall 
also include all additional documents requested by any party in the notice of appeal . . . 
including, but not limited to. . . statements or affidavits considered by the court or 
adnzinistrative agency in the trial ofthe action or proceeding. . . ." (Italics added.) Thus, 
no distinction is made in the Idaho Appellate Rules between a "trial" in a civil court or 
ATTORNEY FEE MEMORANDUM - 4 
before an administrative agency with respect to preparation of the record of the proceeding 
on appeal. Clearly, an administrative proceeding with the right of judicial review: as the 
instant matter, constitutes a "trial" within the meaning of Rule 54(d)(l)(C)(8). Regardless, 
"additional items of cost not enumerated" in subparagraph C may be allowed under Rule 
54(d)(l)(D). 
It is fundamental that local government agencies sit in a quasi-judicial capacity 
when applying general rules or policies to specific individuals, and that such individuals 
are entitled to due process, including judicial review of the agency's decision. Turner v. 
Citv of Twin Falls, 159 P.3d 840 (2007), quoting Cooper v. Board of Countv Comm'rs, 
101 Idaho 407, 410 (1980). See also Comer v. County of Twin Falls, 130 Idaho 433 
(1997) (due process requirements apply to proceedings of local land use boards, including 
decisions on applications for conditional land use permits). The statutory scheme for fees 
and costs in civil and administrative proceedings involving counties clearly indicates that 
the court's discretion under the court's general jurisdiction applies. 
An award of the entire amount of expert witness fees incurred by appellants here is 
clearly warranted under Idaho Code 12-117 and 1.R.C.P Rule 54(d)(l)(D). The costs were 
actually incurred and paid. They were necessary and reasonably incurred because of the 
County Board's position that appellants bore the burden of "documenting" harm from 
blasting and intensive mining operations, rather than requiring Tungsten to "document" 
that no h m  would result. The Board's position co~npelled appellants to bear the costs for 
such expert testimony. This Court made the finding that the Board acted without a 
reasonable basis in fact or law. 
11 ATTORNEY FEE MEMORANDUM - 5 
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I/ The costs are clearly reasonable for the expert's time in traveling to and visiting the 1 1  location, researching and studying the issues, and writing a seven page opinion assessing 
/I the potential for water loss to appellants' property fiom the proposed rock quarry (R.O.A. 11 79-84). This testimony is supported by the expert's sworn declaration documcnting her 
1 1  special knowledge, education, training and experience in hydrology and geology. (R0.A. 
I/ 85-87.) It is undisputed that appellants' expert is qualified to render an opinion. Since the 
!I County Board's actions required appellants to produce such expert documentation, the / / County should pay these fees in the interests of justice Not to pay such legitimate costs 
1 I would have a chilling effect on members of the public exercising their legal rights against 
!I arbitrary government action, and would allow the County to profit by its own wrong. 
Attorney for Petitioners 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that on this 14th day of February, 2008, I delivered a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing ATTORNEY FEE MEMORANDUM, addressed to: 
Boundary County Prosecuting Attorney Phil Robinson 
P.O. Box 1148 Bonner County Prosecuting Attorney 
Bonners Ferry, ID 83805 Courthouse Mail 
Via U.S. Mail Via Hand Delivery 




In the Supreme Court of the State of X 
PATRICK GARDINER and ADA GARDINER, ) 




1 NO. 35007 v. 
) .  
BOUNDARY COUNTY BOARD OF 1 
COMMTSSIONERS, ) 
Defendant-Appellant. 
The Notice of Appeal in the above captioned matter filed in this Court February 
19,2007, requested that a Reporter's Transcript be prepared. However, the Notice of Appeal 
failed to comply with Idaho Appellate Rule 17 in that it did not specify by date and title the 
hearings required to be prepared for purposes of this Appeal: therefore, good cause appearing, 
IT HEREBY IS ORDERED that Appellant shall file an AMENDED NOTICE OF 
APPEAL which complies with Idaho Appellate Rule 17, and shall specify by date and title the 
hearing(s) required to be prepared for purposes of this Appeal. 
IT FURTHER IS ORDER that Appellant shall serve the Reporter(s) with a copy 
of the Amended Notice of Appeal and shall indicate in the Amended Notice of Appeal which 
reporter(s) was served. 
IT FURTHER IS ORDERED the Amended Notice of Appeal shall be filed with 
the District Court within fourteen (14) days from the date of this Order. In the event an 
Amended Notice of Appeal is not filed, this appeal may proceed on the Clerk's Record ONLY. 
DATED this 20" day of February 2008. 
cc: Counsel of Record 
District Court Clerk 
District Court Reporter 
937 . , -~ ~ ~ 
From: BONNER COUNTY PROSECUT"? 12062636726 
Boundary County Civil Attorney 
Philip H. Robinson (ISB#z323) 
FILED 
PO BOX 1405 
Sandpoint, Idaho 83864 
(208) 263-6714 
(208) 263-6726 (Fax) , , , . 
IlV CN DISTRICT COUICT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THX COUNTY OF BOUNDARY 
PATRICK GARDINER and ADA 1 
GARDINER, husband and wife, 1 Case No. C V - ~ o o 6 - o o o o o ~ ~ g  
. I  
1 Plaintiffs-Respondents, 
1 
vs 1 AMENDED 
NOTICE OF APPEXL 
1 
BOUNDARY COUNTY BOARD 1 
OF COMMISSIONERS, 1 
1 
1 
Defendant- Appellant. 1 
TO: The above-named Plaintiffs Ada and Patrick Gardiner and their attorney, 
Paul Vogel PO Box 1828, Sandpoint, ID 83864, the Honorable James Michaud, District 
Judge, Courthouse Mail, Sandpoint, ID 83864, and the Clerk of the above-entitled 
Court. 
NOTICE IS -REBY GIVEN THAT: 
1 .  The above-named Appellant, Boundary County (hereinafter "County"), through 
the Boundary County Board of Commissioners, appeals from a decision made by 
the Honorable James Michaud, District Judge for the First Judicial District of the 
NOTICE. OF APPEAL - I 
CV-20064339 
a l l  0 
State of Idaho, in and for the County of Boundary, who entered his Decision on 
Appeal on the 3rd day of January, 2008, improperly overruling a land-use 
decision of the Board of County Commissioners concerning the approval of a 
special use permit for a gravel pit. 
2. This appeal is taken from the District Court of the First Judicial District of the 
State of Idaho, in and for the County of Boundary. 
3. This appeal is taken to the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho from the 
Honorable James Michaud's Decision on Appeal which determined that the 
County improperly granted a special use permit for a gravel pit. The Court's 
Opinion was entered on the 3rd day of January, 2008 at the Boundary County 
Courthouse, Boundary County, Idaho, by the Honorable James Michaud, District 
Judge presiding. 
4. The County has the right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court and the judgment 
or order described in paragraph I is an appealable order under and pursuant to 
Rule lr(a)(a) I.A.R. in that the order referenced in paragraph I. is a final order of 
the District Court on judicial review reversing the decision of the County. 
5. A preliminary statement of the issues on appeal are: 
A. Did the district court err in holding that, Boundary County's Subdivision 
Ordinance pertaining to special use permits is void? 
B. Did the district court err in its determination that the County improperly 
shifted the burden of persuasion to the Plaintiffs? 
C. Is Boundary County Ordinance in conflict with Idaho Code 67-6512 and 
void on its face?; And 
D. Did the District Court err in awarding attorneys fees and costs to the 
NOTICE OF APPEAL - 2 
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Plaintiffs? 
6. A reporter's transcript of oral arguments of the District Court that took place on 
October 25,2007 regarding the appeal of the decision of the Boundary County 
Board of Commissioners and the February 1,2008 regarding Respondent's 
Objection to Costs and Fees is requested. 
7. Appellant Boundary County requests that the following documents be included in 
the Court's record in addition to those automatically included under Rule 28, 
I.A.R.: the parties' motions, briefs and memorandum below with any briefs, 
memoranda and affidavits concerning all issues appealed from herein should be 
included and allowed into the clerk's record. 
8. I certify: 
(a) That a copy of this Notice of Appeal has been served on the Reporter. 
(ti) That the Appellant is exempt from paying the estimated transcript fee 
because the Appellant is a governmental entity, that being Boundary County, 
Idaho. 
(c) That the Appellant is exempt from paying the estimated fee for the 
preparation of the record because the appellant is a governmental entity, that 
being Boundary County, Idaho. 
(d) That the Appellant is exempt from paying the Appellant filing fee because 
the appellant is a governmental entity, that being Boundary County, Idaho. 
(e) That service has been made upon all parties required to be served 
pursuant to Rule 20. 
NOTICE OF APPEAL - 3 
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DATED this 5th day of March, 2008. 
~ t to rne$  for Boundary County (Appellant) 
CERTIFTCATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on this 5th day of March, 2008,1 caused to be served a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing as addressed to the following: 
Paul Vogel 
Attorney at Law 
PO Box 1828 
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Glenda Poston, County Clerk 
Boundary County 
Courthouse Mailbox 
Idaho Supreme Court 
Attn: Stephen Kenyon 
Clerk of the Courts 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, ID 83720-0101 
IN IN DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST SODICIAL DIS 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF B 
Petitioners, 
vs. 
PATRICK GARDINER and ADA 
GARDINER, husband and wife, 
Order Correcting 
Memorandum Opinion and Order 
CASE NO. CV-2006-339 
BOUNDARY COUNTY BOARD OF 
COMMISSIONERS, 
Respondent. I 
The court previously entered a Memorandum Opinion and Order Setting Aside 
Special Use Permit which contained several grammatical, clerical, and word choice errors. 
Those errors shall be corrected by issuing in accordance with I.R.C.P. 60 (a) a separate 
Memorandum Opinion and Order Setting Aside Special Use Permit (Corrected). Attached 
hereto is a copy showing the corrections in bold italics. The clerk of court shall furnish 
copies of this order and the corrected opinion and order to counsel of record. 
IT IS SO ORDERED at Bonners Ferry this 3"d day of April, 2008. 
h 
Certificate of Delivery 
r d 
I hereby certify that on this 3 day of April, 2008, I delivered a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing Order Correcting Memorandum Opinion and Order via U.S. 
first class mail, postage prepaid or by deposit in the courthouse mailbox, addressed to: 
Phillip Robinson 
Louis Marshall 
Attorneys for Boundary County 
% of Bonner County Prosecutors Office 
Sandpoint, Idaho 
Boundary County Prosecutor's Office 
P.O. Box 3136 
Bonners Ferry, ID 83805 
Paul Vogel 
Attorney at Law 
PO Box 1828 
Sandpoint, Idaho 83860 
c'hor;'3y- 
Deputy Clerk of Court 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOUNDARY 
PATRICK GARDINER and ADA 
GARDINER, husband and wife, 
Petitioners, 
BOUNDARY COUNTY BOARD OF 
COMMISSIONERS, 
CASE NO. CV-2006-339 
Memorandum Opinion and Order 
Setting Aside Special Use Permit 
(Corrected) 
Respondent. I 
Background: The Boundary County Board of Commissioners granted a special use 
permit to Tungsten Holdings, Inc. for a gravel pit operation in an agriculturallforest~y 
zone affer the Boundary County Planning and Zoning Commission had recommended a 
denial of the permit. Petitioners Patrick and Ada Gardiner seek to have this court reverse 
the decision of the county board. 
Holdings: James R. Michaud, Senior District Judge held that: 
I. Petitioners have standing to be heard on their appeal. 
2. The county board's action granting the special use permit to Tungsten may not be 
granted under Boundary County Zoning and Subdivision Ordinance 99-06, Chapter 7, 
pertaining to special use permits. That ordinance violates I.C. 67-6512 which allows a 
special use permit only if the use is a listed conditional use in the applicable zone. The 
use proposed by Tungsten is not a conditional use in the agriculturallforeshy zone in the 
Boundary County Zoning Ordinance. 
3. The county board failed to hold the applicant Tungsten to the burden of persuasion 
required by law. Instead the county board unlawfully imposed upon the petitioners 
Gardiners the burden to demonstrate why the special use permit should not be granted. 
4. The petitioners suffered no prejudice as regards notice of hearing in 2005. They were 
able, due to the remand, to acquire expert hydrological evidence to present at proceedings 
held in 2006. 
6.The use by the county board of a statement of potential findings and conclusions and 
which were prepared prior to the deliberation to guide deliberations is, by itself, not 
arbitrary, capricious nor an abuse of discretion nor a deprivation of due process. 
7. The written decision of the county board does not comply with LC. 67-6535 because it 
is not a reasoned statement that explains the criteria and standards considered relevant. 
The decision does not fairly resolve all relevant contested facts. The decision lacks a 
rationale based upon applicable ordinance and statutory provisions. 
8. The board's decision prejudiced the substantial rights of the petitioners and would, if 
permitted to stand, result in actual harm. They are entitled to relief from this court setting 
aside the decision of the county board. 
9. Petitioners are entitled to recovery of attorney fees and costs incurred in this action. 
1. Fact and Procedural History 
In March 2005, Tungsten Holdings, Inc., a Montana real estate developer 
("Tungsten"), applied for a special use permit to operate a permanent, commercial gravel 
pit on seven acres of property in the agricultural/forestry zone at Porthill, Boundary 
County, Idaho. The proposed gravel pit site is on property adjacent to appellants' 
Registered Angus cattle ranch. The Boundary County Planning & Zoning Commission 
held a public hearing on May 19,2005. R.O.A. 2006, p. 29. The zoning commission 
made findings and a recommendation to the Boundary Coulty Board of Commissioners 
("county board"), to deny the permit. After apublic hearing the county board approved 
the special use permit on September 6,2005. Petitioners filed a request for regulatory 
takings analysis pursuant to I.C. 67-8003 which the board later denied. 
Petitioners filed a petition for judicial review under Boundary County Case No. 
CV-2'005-380. On April 30,2006, Petitioners and the board stipulated that participation 
by board member Dinning in the hearings had been a conflict of interest that was 
prohibited by LC. 67-6506, and that the permit should be voided and the proceedings 
remanded to the board for a new public hearing, without member Dinning participating. 
In the stipulation, Petitioners waived any objection to member Dinning's participation in 
the prior proceedings. On May 26,2006, the Court entered an Order of Remand voiding 
the special use permit and remanding the matter to the county board for a new public 
hearing. 
A new hearing took place on July 24,2006, before board members Smith and 
Kirby. A second board proceeding took place August 7,2006 and board members 
Smith and Kirby approved the special use permit. Petitioners filed a request for 
regulatory takings analysis and the county board denied that a taking had occurred. 
Petitioners filed the petition for judicial review in this case on September 8, 2006. 
II. Issues Presented 
Petitioners raise the following issues in support of the relief sought in their 
petition for judicial review: 
1. Did the county board's action violate LC. 67-6512 in that a special use permit 
may be granted only if the proposed use is conditionally permitted by the terms of the 
zoning ordinance? 
2. Does the county board's decision conflict with Sections I and IV of the 
Comprehensive Plan in that said approval interferes with appellants' health and safety, 
adversely impacts appellants' agricultural use of their property, does not evaluate the 
impact of the gravel pit/rock quarry operation on current uses of surrounding land, and 
constitutes uncompensated deprivation of petitioners' private property rights? 
3. Is the county board's decision supported by substantial evidence in the record? 
4. Does the county board's decision fail to comply with LC. 67-6535 in that the 
findings approved on August 14,2006 do not state the relevant contested facts relied 
upon, fail to explain the rationale for the decision based on applicable provisions of the 
Comprehensive Plan, relevant ordinance and statatory provisions and pertinent 
constitutional principles and factual information contained in the record? 
5. Was the county board's decision made upon unlawful procedure and did it 
deprive appellants of due process of law because of inadequate notice or opportunity to 
respond? 
6. Was the decisioe made upon unlawfd procedure and has it deprived appellants 
of due pr'ocess by the Board's pre-hearing statements of confidence in their Road 
Superintendent's advocacy for the special use permit, pre-hearing discussions between 
the road superintendent and the applicant about obtaining rock from the applicant's 
property, statements at the hearing supportive of the road superintendent in retaliation for 
adjacent property owners' public comment at the zoning commission hearing, and the 
Board's failure to allow appellants to comment on matters outside the record the county 
board relied on in making its decision? 
7. Was the board's decision arbitrary, capricious and an abuse of discretion in that 
deliberations undertaken by the Board on August 7,2006 show bias, and do not constitute 
true deliberations but, instead, consist of a mere recitation of a document containing 
prepared statements and predetermined responses by unknown parties prior to 
deliberation? 
8. Does the board's decision constitute unlawful "spot zoning?" 
9. Has the board's decision prejudiced substantial rights of the appellant? 
10. Are petitioners entitled to recovery of attorney fees and costs incurred in this 
action? 
Respondents raise the following issues: 
1. Do the petitioners have standing to bring their petition for judicial review to 
this court? 
2. Is the county entitled to recover attorney fees and costs against petitioners? 
Not all of the issues raised by the parties will be addressed by the court. The rulings of 
this court on the issues discussed herein render the remaining issues moot. 
111. Nature and Scope of Judicial Review 
The standards governing judicial review provide that this Court shall not 
substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the weight of the evidence presented. 
I.C.967-5279(1). Rather, this court defers to the agency's findings of fact unless they are 
clearly erroneous. Castaneda v. Brighton Corp., 130 Idaho 923, 926, 950 P.2d 1252, 
1265 (1998). The agency's factual determinations are binding on this court, even where 
there is conflicting evidence before the agency, so long as the determinations are 
supported by substantial competent evidence in the record. Judicial review shall be 
conducted by the court without a jury, with the review of disputed issues of fact to be 
confined to the agency record. I.C. 3 67-5277. There is a strong presumption of the 
validity favoring the actions of zoning authorities. Howard v Canyon County Board of 
Commissioners, 128 Idaho 497,480,915 P.2d 709, 710 (1996). 
The county board's decision may only be overturned where its findings: (a) 
violate statutory or constitutional provisions; (b) exceed the agency's statutory authority; 
(c) are made upon unlawful procedure: (d) are not supported by substantial evidence in 
the record; or (e) are arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion. LC. Cj 67-5279. 
Whether the Board of Commissioners violated a statutory provision is a matter of law 
over which the court exercises free review. Friends of Farm to Market v. Valley County, 
137 Idaho 192,196 (2002), Evans v. Tedon County, 139 Idaho 71,75 (2003). Theparty 
attacking the Board's decision must first show that the Board erred in a manner specified 
in Idaho Code Cj 67-5279(3), and then it must show that its substantial right has been 
prejudiced. Price v. Payette County Bd Of Comm'rs, 131 Idaho 426,429,958 P.2d 583, 
586 (1998). 
IV. Analysis 
A. Appellants Have Standing to Challenge the Board of Commissioner's Decision to 
Approve Tungsten's application for a special use permit. 
The county board argues the appellants lack standing citing both I.C. Cj 67-6521(d) 
and I.C. Cj 67-6535. Standing also has a constitutional dimension. This Court fust notes 
that while it recognizes the underlying policy of LC. § 67-6521(d) conferring standing to 
affected persons, it is important to remember that the legislature cannot, by statute, 
relieve a party from meeting the fundamental constitutional requirements for standing. 
See Noh v. Cenarrusa, 137 Idaho 798,53 P.3d 12 17 (2002). 
The Local Land Use Planning Act (LLUPA) confers standing to seek judicial 
review of a local land use decision to an "affected person" aggrieved by the decision. LC. 
Cj 67-652 1(d). An affected person is "one having an interest in real property which may 
be adversely affected by the issuance or denial of a permit authorizing the development." 
LC. § 67-6521(a). Clearly, the appellants' properties may be adversely affected by 
development of a gravel pit operation with associated activities of crushing, blasting and 
truck traffic all on property adjacent to their rural home and cattle operation. The 
appellants have shown they may be affected and therefore they have standing. Standing is 
of course distinguished from entitlement to a remedy. 
I.C. 5 67-6535(c) requires "actual harm or a violation of fundamental rights" to 
obtain a remedy under LLUPA. As stated in Evans v Xeton County, Idaho Board of 
Commissioners, 139 Idaho 71,73 P.3d 84: 
I.C. 5 67-6535(a) requires that approval or denial of any application provided for 
in LLUPA be based on criteria set forth in the local zoning ordinahces and 
comprehensive plan. LC. 5 67-6535(c) directs the review of a LLUPA decision. 
The language in LC. 5 67-6535(c) instructing courts that "[olnly those whose 
challenge to a decision demonstrates actual harm or violation of fundamental 
rights, not the mere possibility thereof, shall be entitled to a remedy or reversal of 
a decision" cannot be construed as a standing requirement. The existence of real 
or potential harm is sufficient to challenge a land use decision. I.C. § 67-6535(c) 
requires a demonstration of actual harm or violation of a fundamental right in 
order to be entitled to a remedy in cases disputing a LLUPA decision. 
Petitioners have met the requirements of I.C. 5 67-6535 as discussed later in this 
Memorandum Opinion. 
B. The special use permit for a gravel pit, rock quarry or surface mining operation 
is not a lawfully issued permit because such uses are not conditional uses listed in 
the agriculturaVforestry zone. 
Tungsten's application was for a special use permit. The zoning commission held 
a special use permit hearing, and the county board considered and premised issuance of 
the permit upon Boundary County Zoning and Subdivision Ordinance 99-06, Chapter 7, 
pertaining to special use permits. 
It is the contention of petitioners that under I.C. 67-6512, a special use permit 
may only be granted for conditionally permitted uses in the zone district and the uses 
proposed by Tungsten are not listed among any category of uses listed in the 
agricultural/forestry zone. The county board argues that appellants read the statute too 
narrowly and it relies on the ordinance to argue that the permit is lawfbl. The county 
board argues that because such permits are "conditionally permitted" that the conflict 
with I.C. 67-6512 alleged by petitioners does not exist. Therefore, according to the 
county board, the ordinance is not in conflict with the statute and by the Tungsten permit 
is proper. The county board's position ignores the plain meaning of the statute which 
requires the use, and not the permit, to be conditionally permitted. It also ignores the 
definition of a conditional use as set forth in the definition section of the zoning 
ordinance. 
This Court must construe a local ordinance as it construes a statute. Friends of Farm 
to Market v Valley County, 137 Idaho at 196,46 P.3d at 13. Such construction begins 
with the literal language of the ordinance. Id. at 197,46 P.3d at 14. If an ordinance is not 
ambiguous, this Court need not consider rules of statutory construction and the ordinance 
is to be given its plain meaning. Hamilton ex rel. Hamilton v. Reeder Flying Serv., 135 
Idaho 568, 572,21 P.3d 890, 894 (2001); CanaI/Norcrest/CoIumbus Action Comm. v. 
City of Boise, 136 Idaho 666,670,39 P.3d 606,610 (2001). Where the language is 
ambiguous, this Court applies rules of construction for guidance. Friends of Farm to 
Market v Valley County, 137 Idaho at 197,46 P.3d at 14. Constructions that lead to 
absurd or unreasonably harsh results are disfavored. Id. All sections of an applicable 
ordinance must be construed together to determine the legislative body's intent. Id. (citing 
Lockhart v. Dept. of Fish and Game, 121 Idaho 894,897,828 P.2d 1299, 1302 (1992)). 
Ordinances are to be construed so as to give effect to all their provisions and not to render 
any part superfluous or insignificant. Id. (citing Brown v. Caldwell Sch. Dist. No. 132, 
127 Idaho 112, 117,898 P.2d 43,48 (1995)). There is a presumption that a local zoning 
board's actions are valid when interpreting and applying its own zoning ordinances. Id.; 
Evans, 137 Idaho at 431,50 P.3d at 446. 
A conditional use is defined in the definition section of the ordinance as follows: 
"Any use within a particular zone district specified by Chapter 7 of this ordinance and 
specifically referred to as a conditional use, subject to the procedures set forth at Chapter 
12". Section 1E of Chapter 7 of the zoning ordinance states: "Any use not specified in 
this section as a use by right or conditional use is eligible for consideration as a special 
use, subject to the provisions of Chapter 13." Chapter 13 of the zoning ordinance 
delineates the procedures for obtaining a special use pennit. By its terms I.C. 67-6512 
provides that a special use permit may be granted to an applicant "if the proposed use is 
conditionally permitted by the terms of the ordinance." Chapter 7, Section 1 of the 
Boundary County Zoning Ordinance specifies three categories of uses that are allowed in 
an agriculturelforestry zone. They are: uses by right, permitted uses, and conditional uses. 
Gravel pits, rock quarries, surface mining operations, rock or gravel extraction activities 
are not listed on any list of uses in any of the three categories in the county ordinance. 
The county board adopted its planning staff determination that the use proposed 
by Tungsten may be considered a commercial use and thus permitted under the 
conditional uses of the agriculturallforestry zone. Chapter 13 does provide for a 
conditional use permit for commercial business or commercial activity in the 
agriculturaVforestry zone. Considering the nature and purpose of comprehensive planning 
and zoning, the zones described in the Boundary County zoning ordinance, and the uses 
permitted, it is not reasonable to conclude that a gravel pit or surface mining operation 
with its aspects of excavation, crushing and blasting can be deemed a commercial 
activity. There is an important distinction between commercial and industrial uses. 
Gravel pits and surface mines, in the context of community planning and zoning, are an 
activity of an extractive and industrial nature involving raw material extraction and 
processes such as excavation and crushing with use of heavy equipment and blasting. 
The definition of industrial use in the zoning ordinance is: "Commercial: A use or 
structure intended primarily for the conduct of retail trade in goods and services." The 
definition of industrial use in the zoning ordinance is "Industrial: Use of a parcel or 
development of a structure intended primarily for the manufacture, assembly or finishing 
of products intended primarily for wholesale distribution." The use sought by Tungsten 
might be termed industrial but certainly not commercial. Industrial uses and commercial 
uses may not be conditionally permitted in the agriculturaUforestry zone under the zoning 
ordinance. 
Whether the Board of Commissioners violated a statutory provision is a matter of 
law over which the court exercises free review. Friends of Farm to Market v. Valley 
County, 137 Idaho 192,196 (2002), Evans v. Teton CounW, 139 Idaho 71,75 (2003). A 
county has no authority to act on an ordinance that conflicts with I.C. 67-6512. Fischer 
v. City of Ketchurn, 141 Idaho 349,356 (2005). It is fundamental that a county ordinance 
may not conflict with general laws. Boise v. Bench Sewer Dist, 116 Idaho 25 (1989) 
(county ordinance that conflicts with general law is void); Brower v. Bingham County, 
140 Idaho 5 12,515 (2004) (county ordinance that conflicts with local land use planning 
statutes is void); In re Ridenbaugh, 5 Idaho 371,375 (1897) (under section 2 of article 12 
of the Idaho Constitution, counties may not enact regulations that are in conflict with the 
general laws). 
I.C. 5 67-6512 is applicable to this case. Because a gravel pit, rock quarry or 
surface mining operation is not listed as a conditional use, and cannot be deemed a 
commercial use, a special use permit cannot be lawfully issued under the regulations for 
the agricufturallforestry zone of the Boundary County zoning ordinance. 
In purporting to make a property use that is not conditionally permitted eligible 
for pennit as a special use, Section 1E of Chapter 7 of the zoning ordinance conflicts with 
I.C. 67-6512. Therefore that section of the ordinance is void. The special use permit 
granted to Tungsten by the county board was predicated upon a section of the zoning 
ordinance which is in conflict with Idaho law. LC. 67-5279 prohibits the granting of 
permits under an ordinance in violation of statutory provision or in excess of the authority 
of the county board. Because the permit was issued pursuant to a void ordinance the 
county board exceeded its statutory authority which is limited by I.C. 5 67-6512. The 
Tungsten permit is prejudicial to the interests of petitioners within the meaning of LC. 5 
67-5279(4) as explained below. Even if the ordinance did not conflict with the statute, the 
use proposed by Tungsten is not a conditional use or activity permitted under the 
ordinance because the use proposed is not a commercial use or activity. 
The county board's decision to issue the Tungsten permit is therefore reversed. 
The permit was issued pursuant to a void ordinance. Alternatively, if the ordinance is not 
void the permit was issued in violafion of that ordinance. Therefore, there is no occasion 
for this court to remand this matter to the county board for furfher hearing. 
C. Petitioner's were not prejudiced by lack of adequate notice prior to the hearing 
or by the refusal of the county board to grant a continuance. 
The Zoning Office gave petitioners 15 days' notice of the hearing to be held in 
2005 as required by Chapters 13 and 16 of the ordinance. The petitioners claim that in 
view of the county board's requirement that petitioners needed expert evidence to prove 
that the applicant failed to comply with the plan and ordinance, rather than the other way 
around, the abbreviated 15 day notice period was completely inadequate to protect 
appellants' rights. 
Petitioners contend that through its road superintendent, the county knew about 
Tungsten's intentions long before the zoning commission hearing in May 2005. They 
argue that the county did not mail notice of the application to petitioners or otherwise 
provide public notice until May 2,2005, only two weeks before the hearing. R.O.A. 
2005, p. 98. Petitioners' request for continuance of that hearing to submit expert 
evidence was denied. Petitioners' subsequent request for continuance of the county board 
hearing was denied on the basis that appellants had not obtained their expert evidence for 
the zoning hearing. They claim this is a Catch 22 and the county's hearing process 
deprived Petitioners of due process. 
Decisions by zoning commissions are "quasi-judicial" in nature. Cowan v. Board 
of Comnzissioners of Fremont County, Docket No. 30061,2006 Opinion No. 107,2006 
Ida. LEXIS 151 (November 29,2006,), p. 16 of Opinion, quoting from Chambers v. 
Kootenai County Bd. Of Comm 'rs, 125 Idaho 1 15,118 (1 994). Land use hearings that 
are quasi-judicial are subject to due process constraints. Id. Procedural due process 
requires some process to ensure the individual is not arbitrarily deprived of his rights in 
violation of the state or federal constitutions. Id. Due process issues are generally 
questions of law over which the court exercises free review. Id. p. 17. 
Notice for special use permit hearings is governed by LC. 67-6512. LC. 67- 
65 12(b) provides for published notice 15 days before the hearing, and that specific notice 
be given to property owners within 300 feet of the property being considered, and to "any 
additional area that may be substantially impacted by the proposed special use" as 
determined by the zoning commission. Chapter 13, Section 4(B) and Chapter 16 of the 
zoning ordinance requires only 15 days' notice be given to property owners within 300 
feet of the land being considered. R.O.A. 2006, p. 259. 
Petitioners claim that the notice provisions in the zoning ordinance are inadequate 
to provide due process to impacted rural communities. Farm and ranch properties 
generally exceed 300 feet from all but their adjacent neighbors. They also argue: 
that in rural areas such as Porthill, the 300 foot limitation essentially restricts 
notice to all but the two or three neighboring farms. 
the impact of a gravel pithock quarry operation affects the entire community, not 
just the two adjacent neighbors. Such limited notice conflicts with LC. section 
67-6512@). 
* with only the nearest property owners notified, special use permits can be granted 
more or less in secret. Property owners or the county ca l  quietly impose non- 
compatible uses without the impacted community being aware, as happened with 
the prior two special use permit applications in Porthill. 
notice by publication is insufficient to directly notice all of the impacted property 
owners in a rural area. 
these limitations prevent due process and fair hearings. 
In planning and zoning decisions, due process requires an opportunity to present and 
rebut evidence. Cowan v. Board o f  Commr '8, supra. The petitioners got notice as 
provided by law. Petitioners sought a continuance in order to obtain expert testimony. 
The county board's denial of petitioner's motion for continuance prior to the 2005 
hearing was an abuse of discretion especially because the county board placed (albeit 
unlawhlly) upon petitioners the burden to show the permit should not be issued to 
Tungsten. Such an abuse of discretion would operate to deny a fair hearing. However, 
petitioners were not prejudiced by the denial since they were able to obtain expert 
hydrological evidence to present at the hearing in 2006. 
Petitioners do not have standing to complain about lack of notice to other landowners 
who did not get notice in a case where petitioners seek a petition for judicial review. In 
an appeal proceeding such as these petitioners cannot seek relief for others because the 
procedural rules do not permit a claim for others. Other persons claiming entitlement to 
notice would have to b r i g  their own petition for review to this court and therein show 
their own entitlement to standing. 
D. The county board, by failing to hold Tungsten to the burden of persuasion, made 
their decision in violation of the county zoning ordinance and engaged in an 
unlawful procedure resulting in a decision which must be set aside. 
At the hearing held July 26,2005 Chairman Smith asked appellants for "any fact" 
or "documentation" that dynamiting could affect somebody's water, or if that was "just a 
fear" appellan& had. C.T. 7/26/05, p.15:23-25, p.16:2-12. During that same hearing 
Chairman Smith said that Rick Dinning had a "right" to have a gravel pit. C.T. 7/26/05, 
p. 43: 11. Board chairman Smith also directed the staff to "come up with" conditions to 
"ease the pain" on the community. His directive to staff was that one of the conditions 
could not be to not have a gravel pit. C.T. 7/26/05, p. 43:15-21. At the hearing on August 
8,2005 Chairman Smith said he "definitely wantled] to approve the pit," and did not 
want "delaying tactics" or "road blocks" to "put off the inevitable." 
The burden of persuasion is upon the applicant to show that all of the 
requirements for a special use permit are satisfied. Fischer v. City of Ketchurn, 141 Idaho 
349, 109 p.31d 1091 (Idaho 2005). The statements by board chair Smith indicate that the 
burden was upon the Gardiners. There is no indication of any change between the 2005 
and 2006 county board proceeding as regards the statements related to the proper 
allocation of the burden of persuasion. There is no indication at the hearings held in 2006 
or in the written decision of August 14,2006 that the board was holding the applicant 
Tungsten to the burden of persuasion. 
The county board failed to impose upon Tungsten the burden of persuasion 
required by the ordinance provisions concerning special use permits or conditional use 
permits. Instead the county board unlawfully placed the burden of showing that the 
permit could not be issued upon Gardimers who opposed the application of Tungsten. The 
decision of the county board has thus been rendered upon an unlawfid procedure. 
Therefore pursuant to LC. 67-5279 the decision granting the permit to Tungsten is set 
aside in it entirety. 
E. The written decision of the county board does not comply with I.C. 67-6535 
because it is not a reasoned statement that explains the criteria and standards 
considered relevant. The decision does not fairly resolve all relevant contested facts. 
The decision lacks a rationale based upon applicable ordinance and statutory 
provisions. 
Assuming that the Boundary County Zoning Ordinance authorizes a special use 
permit in an agriculturaUforestry zone, the board's decision must comply with LC. 67- 
6535. Under I.C. 67-6535 the issuance of a written decision regarding a local land use 
agency's approval or denial of a land use application is required. Evans v. Teton County, 
139 Idaho 71,80 (2003). LC. 67-6535 requires the findings to be in writing explaining 
the relevant criteria and standards, the relevant contested facts, and the rationale for the 
decision based on the applicable provisions of the comprehensive plan and ordinance and 
factual information contained in the record. The decision must demonstrate that the 
agency applied the criteria prescribed by the law, and did not act arbitrarily or on an ad- 
hoc basis. Workman Family Partnership v. City of Twin Falls,_l04 Idaho 32 (1982). 
Under LC. 67-6535, land use decisions are to be founded upon sound reason and 
practical application of recognized principles of law. In reviewing such decisions, courts 
are directed to consider the proceedings as a whole and to evaluate the adequacy of 
procedures and resultant decisions in the light of practical considerations, hdarnental 
fairness and the essentials of reasoned decision-making. The decision of the county 
board in this case violates petitioners' rights. 
Petitioners contend that no meaningful discussion took place in the August 7, 
2006 hearing and that Chairman Smith simply parroted a document prepared in advance 
to bring the matter to a close. The use of a document, prepared in advance by staff, 
identifying alternative findings or choices can be useful as a checklist to guide decision 
makers. As such a properly prepared document can be a useful part of the quasi-judicial 
process, assuming relevant choices or alternatives are listed and assuming it is understood 
not to limit the decision makers but to guide them as to all the issues for decision. The 
focus should be upon the board's written decision. The transcript of the board proceeding 
has also been reviewed in detail and considered by this court. 
This c o w  must review the record to determine whether the relevant issues were 
identified and factual conflicts determined upon the available evidence. The court's task 
is to determine whether the rationale of the written decision is supported by the proper 
evaluation of evidence and application of the standards provided by law. In this case both 
the written decision issued August 14,2006 and the transcript of the August 7,2006 
board proceeding show an absence of meaningful consideration of issues or resolution of 
conflicting factual information using the applicable criteria required by law. The colloquy 
behveen Smith and Kirby at the board proceeding of August 7,2006 does not address or 
resolve the material factual issues concerning the contentions regarding well dewatering 
and the impact of noise upon the cattle operation. The same is true as regards the impact 
upon the petitioners enjoyment of their residential rural property. There is no indication 
of a proper allocation of the burden of persuasion to contradict the statements by Chair 
Smith mentioned July 26,2005. The county board discounted the expert opinion of the 
hydrologist without basis for doing so. The county board decision briefly comments on 
dust abatement but does not fairly address the contentious issues of the adverse impact of 
the uses proposed by Tungsten upon the use and the peaceful enjoyment of petitioners' 
property. The impacts asserted relative to the cattle operation are dealt with in a 
conclusory fashion. A rationale for the conclusions relevant to a fair decision upon the 
application is not demonstrated. Thus there is no showing of a proper exercise of 
discretion. The written decision ultimately issued August 14,2006 was likewise 
conclusory and lacks evidence of considered deliberation. As previously discussed 
incorrect criteria and standards were applied. The county board's decision must be set 
aside because it violates I.C. 67-6535. 
F. Petitioners substantial rights have been prejudiced and they are entitled to relief. 
The Board's action granting the special use permit to Tungsten prejudices 
petitioners because the gravel pit operation would likely cause actual harm by disrupting 
the use and the peaceful enjoyment of petitioners property. Petitioners have also shown 
prejudice to their substantial rights to proper application of both procedural and 
substantive law. Therefore, they have shown entitlement to relief from this court as 
required by I.C. 67-6259 and I.C. 67-6535. 
G. Petitioners are entitled to recovery of attorney fees and costs. 
Appellants claim entitlement to an award of attorney fees and costs pursuant to 
I.C. 12-1 17 (1) which states, in part, that: 
(1) Unless otherwise provided by statute, in 
any administrative or civil judicial proceeding 
involving as adverse parties a .  . . county. . . and a 
person, the court shall award the prevailing party 
reasonable attorney's fees, witness fees and reasonable 
expenses, if the court finds that the party against whom 
the judgment is rendered acted without a reasonable 
basis in fact or law. 
Idaho Supreme Court cases are instructive on this issue of attorney fees involving 
government action. The standard for awarding attorney fees under I.C. 12-1 17 requires 
focusing on the overall action of the agency. Rincover v. State Dep 't of Fh., 129 Idaho 
442 (1996). 
In Reardon v. City of Burley, 140 Idaho 115 (2004), the Idaho Supreme Court 
quoted prior case law and stated: 
The purpose of I.C. $ 12-1 17 is two-fold: First, it 
serves "as a deterrent to groundless arbitrary agency 
action; and [second] it provides a remedy for persons 
who have borne unfair and unjustified financial 
burdens defending against groundless charges or 
attempting to correct mistakes agencies never should 
have made. 
Under the statute, attorney fees must be awarded if the court finds in favor of the 
appellant and further finds that the county acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law. 
In Reardon attorney fees were awarded to the plaintiff on the basis that the court 
determined that the county acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law where an 
agency had no authority to take a particular action. In that case, a county ordinance was 
enacted contrary to the provisions of Idaho's Local Land Use Planning Act. The court 
noted that the county's ability to make and enforce local regulations was dependent on 
the fact that the regulations were not in conflict with the general laws of the state of 
Idaho. Idaho Const. Art. XII, $2. 
While the county ordinance in Reardon involved areas of city impact, the 
argument is applicable in this case because respondent Boundary County enacted Chapter 
7 Section 1 (E) in December, 2001 at a point in time after the Legislature repealed similar 
language in the earlier version of I.C. 67-6512. The county board is charged with 
knowledge that at time of enactment of the ordinance that the language contained therein 
had been expressly disapproved by the Legislature. In this case appellants' original 
Petition for Judicial Review, filed October 3,2005, raised this issue. The issue was 
reasserted in appellants' Petition for Judicial Review filed September 11,2006. 
In Fischer v. City of Ketchum, 141 Idaho 349 (2004), the Idaho Supreme Court 
awarded attorney fees against the City of Ketchum. The basis was that the city wholly 
ignored a provision of its ordinance requiring certification by an Idaho licensed engineer 
prior to granting of a conditional use permit. The Boundary County ordinance provisions 
of Chapter 13: Special Uses Section 4: Application Procedure: subparagraph C.4) 
require the county to fmd that the proposed special use will not create noise, traffic, 
odors, dust or other nuisances substantially in excess of permitted uses within the zone 
district. Idaho law clearly places the burden of persuasion upon the applicant for a 
special use permit. The failure of the county board to place the burden upon the applicant 
is prohibited conduct because the county ignored the provisions of its own zoning 
ordinance and violated state law. 
The issue of attorney fees was present in County Residents Against Pollutionfrom 
Septic Sludge (CRAPSS) v. Bonner County, 138 Idaho 585 (2003). The Idaho Supreme 
Court in that case upheld the decision of the District Court awarding attorney fees against 
the respondent county. The Idaho Supreme Court stated that when the county failed to 
follow its ordinance, it acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law. In that Bonner 
County case, the county arbitrarily dismissed plaintiffs' administrative appeal with no 
basis. In this case concerning the Tungsten application, the county board arbitrarily 
granted the special use permit with no basis under the ordinance for doing so. 
The court concludes that the overall action of the county board warrants this 
courts's determination that the county board acted without a reasonable basis in fact or 
law. Therefore, petitioners are entitled to attorney fees and costs on appeal. Attorney fees 
are limited to proceedings subsequent to the stipulation of the parties that each would 
bear their own fees incurred prior to April 30,2006. 
V. Conclusion 
Petitioner's request that the agency action be set aside is granted. Under the 
provisions of I.C. 67-5279(3) the decision of the county board was: 
a. In violation of constitutional and statutory provisions; 
b. In excess of the statutory authority of the agency; and 
c. Made upon unlawful procedure. 
Defects in hearing procedure in some cases warrant remand for further proceedings to be 
held in conformity with the law. However, in this case there shall be no remand. The 
county board acted either upon an invalid ordinance or failed to comply with the 
ordinance if the ordinance is considered valid. The county board acted in excess of their 
lawful authority. 
VI. Order 
The county board decision to issue the special use permit to Tungsten is set aside. 
Petitioners are entitled to an award of attorney fees and costs against the respondent. 
Done and dated this 3rd day of January, 2008, with corrections made April 3, 
2008. 
James R. Michaud 
Senior district Judge 
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(Corrected) 
Respondent. I 
Background: The Boundary County Board of Commissioners granted a special use 
permit to Tungsten Holdings, Inc. for a gravel pit operation in an agricultural/forestry 
zone after the Boundary County Planning and Zoning Commission had recommended a 
denial of the permit. Petitioners Patrick and Ada Gardiner seek to have this court reverse 
the decision ofthe county board. 
Holdings: James R. Michaud, Senior District Judge held that: 
1. Petitioners have standing to be heard on their appeal. 
2. The county board's action granting the special use permit to Tungsten may not be 
granted under Boundary County Zoning and Subdivision Ordinance 99-06, Chapter 7, 
pertaining to special use permits. That ordinance violates LC. 67-6512 which allows a 
special use permit only if the use is a listed conditional use in the applicable zone. The 
use proposed by Tungsten is not a conditional use in the agriculturallforestry zone in the 
Boundary County Zoning Ordinance. 
3. The county board failed to hold the applicant Tungsten to the burden of persuasion 
required by law. Instead the county board unlawfully imposed upon the petitioners 
Gardiners the burden to demonstrate why the special use permit should not be granted. 
4. The petitioners suffered no prejudice as regards notice of hearing in 2005. They were 
able, due to the remand, to acquire expert hydrological evidence to present at proceedings 
held in 2006. 
6.The use by the county board of a statement of potential findings and conclusions and 
which were prepared prior to the deliberation to guide deliberations is, by itself, not 
arbitrary, capricious nor an abuse of discretion nor a deprivation of due process. 
7. The written decision of the county board does not comply with I.C. 67-6535 because it 
is not a reasoned statement that explains the criteria and standards considered relevant. 
The decision does not fairly resolve all relevant contested facts. The decision lacks a 
rationale based upon applicable ordinance and statutory provisions. 
8. The board's decision prejudiced the substantial rights of the petitioners and would, if 
permitted to stand, result in actual harm. They are entitled to relief from this court setting 
aside the decision of the county board. 
9. Petitioners are entitled to recovery of attorney fees and costs incurred in this action. 
I. Fact and Procedural History 
In March 2005, Tungsten Holdings, Inc., a Montana real estate developer 
("Tungsten"), applied for a special use permit to operate a permanent, commercial gravel 
pit on seven acres of property in the agricultural/forestry zone at Porthill, Boundary 
County, Idaho. The proposed gravel pit site is on property adjacent to appellants' 
Registered Angus cattle ranch. The Boundary County Planning & Zoning Commission 
held a public hearing on May 19,2005. R.O.A. 2006, p. 29. The zoning commission 
made findings and a recommendation to the Boundary County Board of Commissioners 
("county board"), to deny the permit. After a public hearing the county board approved 
the special use permit on September 6,2005. Petitioners filed a request for regulatory 
takings analysis pursuant to LC. 67-8003 which the board later denied. 
Petitioners filed a petition for judicial review under Boundary County Case No. 
CV-2005-380. On April 30,2006, Petitioners and the board stipulated that participation 
by board member Dinning in the hearings had been a conflict of interest that was 
prohibited by LC. 67-6506, and that the permit should be voided and the proceedings 
remanded to the board for a new public hearing, without member Dinning participating. 
In the stipulation, Petitioners waived any objection to member Dinning's participation in 
the prior proceedings. On May 26,2006, the Court entered an Order of Remand voiding 
the special use permit and remanding the matter to the county board for a new public 
hearing. 
A new hearing took place on July 24,2006, before board members Smith and 
Kirby. A second board proceeding took place August 7,2006 and board members 
Smith and Kirby approved the special use permit. Petitioners filed a request for 
regulatory takings analysis and the county board denied that a taking had occurred. 
Petitioners filed the petition for judicial review in this case on September 8,2006. 
n. Issues Presented 
Petitioners raise the following issues in support of the relief sought in their 
petition for judicial review: 
1. Did the county board's action violate I.C. 67-6512 in that a special use permit 
may be granted only if the proposed use is conditionally permitted by the terms of the 
zoning ordinance? 
2. Does the county board's decision conflict with Sections I and IV of the 
Comprehensive Plan in that said approval interferes with appellants' health and safety, 
adversely impacts appellants' agricultural use of their property, does not evaluate the 
impact of the gravel pit/rock quarry operation on current uses of surrounding land, and 
constitutes uncompensated deprivation of petitioners' private property rights? 
3. Is the county board's decision supported by substantial evidence in the record? 
4. Does the county board's decision fail to comply with LC. 67-6535 in that the 
fmdings approved on August 14, 2006 do not state the relevant contested facts relied 
upon, fail to explain the rationale for the decision based on applicable provisions of the 
Comprehensive Plan, relevant ordinance and statutory provisions and pertinent 
constitutional principles and factual information contained in the record? 
5. Was the county board's decision made upon unlawfbl procedure and did it 
deprive appellants of due process of law because of inadequate notice or opportunity to 
respond? 
6. Was the decision made upon unlawful procedure and has it deprived appellants 
of due process by the Board's pre-hearing statements of confidence in their Road 
Superintendent's advocacy for the special use permit, pre-hearing discussions between 
the road superintendent and the applicant about obtaining rock from the applicant's 
property, statements at the hearing supportive of the road superintendent in retaliation for 
adjacent property owners' public comment at the zoning commission hearing, and the 
Board's failure to allow appellants to comment on matters outside the record the county 
board relied on in making its decision? 
7. Was the board's decision arbitrary, capricious and an abuse of discretion in that 
deliberations undertaken by the Board on August 7,2006 show bias, and do not constitute 
true deliberations but, instead, consist of a mere recitation of a document containing 
prepared statements and predetermined responses by unknown parties prior to 
deliberation? 
8. Does the board's decision constitute unlawful "spot zoning?" 
9. Has the board's decision prejudiced substantial rights of the appellant? 
10. Are petitioners entitled to recovery of attorney fees and costs incurred in this 
action? 
Respondents raise the following issues: 
1. Do the petitioners have standing to bring their petition for judicial review to 
this court? 
2. Is the county entitled to recover attorney fees and costs against petitioners? 
Not a11 of the issues raised by the parties will be addressed by the court. The rulings of 
this court on the issues discussed herein render the remaining issues moot. 
111. Nature and Scope of Judicial Review 
The standards governing judicial review provide that this Court shall not 
substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the weight of the evidence presented. 
LC.$67-5279(1). Rather, this court defers to the agency's findings of fact unless they are 
clearly erroneous. Castaneda v. Brighton Corp., 130 Idaho 923, 926, 950 P.2d 1262, 
1265 (1998). The agency's factual determinations are binding on this court, even where 
there is conflicting evidence before the agency, so long as the determinations are 
supported by substantial competent evidence in the record. Judicial review shall be 
conducted by the court without a jury, with the review of disputed issues of fact to be 
confined to the agency record. LC. $ 67-5277. There is a strong presumption of the 
validity favoring the actions of zoning authorities. Howard v Canyon County Board of 
Commissioners, 128 Idaho 497,480,915 P.2d 709,710 (1996). 
The county board's decision may only be overturned where its findings: (a) 
violate statutory or constitutional provisions; (b) exceed the agency's statutory authority; 
(c) are made upon unlawful procedure: (d) are not supported by substantial evidence in 
the record; or (e) are arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion. I.C. $ 67-5279. 
Whether the Board of Commissioners violated a stahtory provision is a matter of law 
over which the court exercises fiee review. Friends ofFarm to Market v. Valley County, 
137 Idaho 192,196 (2002), Evans v. Teton County, 139 Idaho 71,75 (2003). The party 
attacking the Board's decision must first show that the Board erred in a manner specified 
in Idaho Code $ 67-5279(3), and then it must show that its substantial right has been 
prejudiced. Price v. Payette County Bd. Of Comm'rs, 131 Idaho 426,429,958 P.2d 583, 
586 (1998). 
IV. Analysis 
A. Appellants Have Standig to Challenge the Board of Commissioner's Decision to 
Approve Tungsten's application for a special use permit. 
The county board argues the appellants lack standing citing both I.C. $67-652l(d) 
and LC. $ 67-6535. Standmg also has a constitutional dimension. This Court first notes 
that while it recognizes the underlying policy of I.C. $ 67-6521(d) conferring standing to 
affected persons, it is important to remember that the legislature cannot, by statute, 
relieve a party from meeting the fundamental constitutional requirements for standing. 
See Noh v. Cenarrusa, 137 Idaho 798,53 P.3d 1217 (2002). 
The Local Land Use PIanning Act (LLUPA) confers standing to seek judicial 
review of a local land use decision to an "affected person" aggrieved by the decision. LC. 
$ 67-6521(d). An affected person is "one having an interest in real property which may 
be adversely affected by the issuance or denial of a permit authorizing the development." 
I.C. $ 67-6521(a). Clearly, the appellants' properties may be adversely affected by 
development of a gravel pit operation with associated activities of crushing, blasting and 
truck traffic all on property adjacent to their rural home and cattIe operation. The 
appellants have shown they may be affected and therefore they have standing. Standing is 
of course distinguished from entitlement to a remedy. 
LC. 9 67-6535(c) requires "actual harm or a violation of fundamental rights" to 
obtain a remedy under LLUPA. As stated in Evans v Teton County, Idaho Board of 
Commissioners, 139 Idaho 71, 73 P.3d 84: 
I.C. 9 67-6535(a) requires that approval or denial of any application provided for 
in LLUPA be based on criteria set forth in the local zoning ordinances and 
comprehensive plan. I.C. 5 67-653S(c) directs the review of a LLWA decision. 
The language in I.C. 9 67-6535(c) instructing courts that "[olnly those whose 
challenge to a decision demonstrates actual harm or violation of fundamental 
rights, not the mere possibility thereof, shall be entitled to a remedy or reversal of 
a decision" cannot be construed as a standing requirement. The existence of real 
or potential harm is sufticient to challenge a land use decision. LC. 9 67-6535(c) 
requires a demonstration of actual harm or violation of a fundamental right in 
order to be entitled to a remedy in cases disputing a LLUPA decision. 
Petitioners have met the requirements of I.C. 9 67-6535 as discussed later in this 
Memorandum Opinion. 
B. The special use permit for a gravel pit, rock quarry or surface mining operation 
is not a lawfully issued permit because such uses are not conditional uses listed in 
the agricu1turaVforestt-y zone. 
Tungsten's application was for a special use permit. The zoning commission held 
a special use permit hearing, and the county board considered and premised issuance of 
the permit upon Boundary County Zoning and Subdivision Ordinance 99-06, Chapter 7, 
pertaining to special use permits. 
It is the contention of petitioners that under LC. 67-6512, a special use permit 
may only be granted for conditionally permitted uses in the zone district and the uses 
proposed by Tungsten are not listed among any category of uses listed in the 
agricultural/forestry zone. The county board argues that appellants read the statute too 
narrowly and it relies on the ordinance to argue that the permit is lawful. The county 
board argues that because such permits are "conditionally permitted" that the conflict 
with I.C. 67-6512 alleged by petitioners does not exist. Therefore, according to the 
county board, the ordinance is not in conflict with the statute and by the Tungsten permit 
is proper. The county board's position ignores the plain meaning of the statute which 
requires the use, and not the permit, to be conditionally permitted. It also ignores the 
defintion of a conditional use as set forth in the definition section of the zoning 
ordinance. 
This Court must construe a local ordinance as it construes a statute. Friends ofFarm 
to Market v Valley County, 137 Idaho at 196,46 P.3d at 13. Such construction begins 
with the literal language of the ordinance. Id. at 197,46 P.3d at 14. If an ordinance is not 
ambiguous, this Court need not consider rules of statutory construction and the ordinance 
is to be given its plain meaning. Hamilton ex rel. Hanzilton v. Reeder Flying Serv., 135 
Idaho 568,572,21 P.3d 890,894 (2001); CanaVNorcrest/ColumbbuAction Comm. v. 
City of Boise, 136 Idaho 666,670,39 P.3d 606,610 (2001). Where the language is 
ambiguous, this Court applies rules of construction for guidance. Friends of Farm to 
Market v Valley County, 137 Idaho at 197,46 P.3d at 14. Constructions that lead to 
absurd or unreasonably harsh results are disfavored. Id. All sections of an applicable 
ordinance must be construed together to determine the legislative body's intent. Id. (citing 
Lockhart v. Dept. of Fish and Game, 121 Idaho 894,897,828 P.2d 1299, 1302 (1992)). 
Ordinances are to be construed so as to give effect to all their provisions and not to render 
any part superfluous or insignificant. Id. (citing Brown v. Caldwell Sch. Disf. No. 132, 
127 Idaho 112,117, 898 P.2d 43,48 (1995)). There is a presumption that a local zoning 
board's actions are valid when interpreting and applying its own zoning ordinances. Id.; 
Evans, 137 Idaho at 431,50 P.3d at 446. 
A conditional use is defined in the definition section of the ordinance as follows: 
"Any use within a particular zone district specified by Chapter 7 of this ordinance and 
specifically referred to as a conditiollal use, subject to the procedures set forth at Chapter 
12". Section IE of Chapter 7 of the zoning ordinance states: "Any use not specified in 
this section as a use by right or conditional use is eligibfe for consideration as a special 
use, subject to the provisions of Chapter 13." Chapter 13 of the zoning ordinance 
delineates the procedures for obtaining a special use permit. By its terms I.C. 67-6512 
provides that a special use permit may be granted to an applicant "if the proposed use is 
conditionally permitted by the terms of the ordinance." Chapter 7, Section 1 of the 
Boundary County Zoning Ordinance specifies three categories of uses that are allowed in 
an agricultue/forestry zone. They are: uses by right, permitted uses, and conditional uses. 
Gravel pits, rock quarries, surface mining operations, rock or gravel extraction activities 
are not listed on any list of uses in any of the three categories in the county ordinance. 
The county board adopted its planning staff determination that the use proposed 
by Tungsten may be considered a commercial use and thus permitted under the 
conditional uses of the agricultural/forestry zone. Chapter 13 does provide for a 
conditional use permit for commercial business or commercial activity in the 
agricultural/forestry zone. Considering the nature and purpose of comprehensive planning 
and zoning, the zones described in the Boundary County zoning ordinance, and the uses 
permitted, it is not reasonable to conclude that a gravel pit or surface mining operation 
with its aspects of excavation, crushing and blasting can be deemed a commercial 
activity. There is an important distinction between commercial and industrial uses. 
Gravel pits and surface mines, in the context of community planning and zoning, are an 
activity of an extractive and industrial nature involving raw material extraction and 
processes such as excavation and crushing with use of heavy equipment and blasting. 
The definition of industrial use in the zoning ordinance is: "Co~nmercial: A use or 
structure intended primarily for the conduct of retail trade in goods and services." The 
definition of industrial use in the zoning ordinance is "Industrial: Use of a parcel or 
development of a structure intended primarily for the manufacture, assembly or fdshing 
of products intended primarily for wholesale distribution." The use sought by Tungsten 
might be termed industrial but certainly not commercial. Industrial uses and commercial 
uses may not be conditionally permitted in the agricultural/forestry zone under the zoning 
ordinance. 
Whether the Board of Commissioners violated a statutory provision is a matter of 
law over which the court exercises free review. Friends of Farm to Market v. Valley 
County, 137 Idaho 192,196 (2002), Evans v. Teton Counlv, 139 Idaho 71,75 (2003). A 
county has no authority to act on an ordinance that conflicts with I.C. 67-6512. Fischer 
v. City of Ketchurn, 141 Idaho 349,356 (2005). It is fundamental that a county ordinance 
may not conflict with general laws. Boise v. Bench Sewer Dist:, 116 Idaho 25 (1989) 
(county ordinance that conflicts with general law is void); Brower v. Bingham County, 
140 Idaho 5 12,5 15 (2004) (county ordinance that conflicts with local land use planning 
statutes is void); In re Ridenbaugh, 5 Idaho 371,375 (1897) (under section 2 of article 12 
of the Idaho Constitution, counties may not enact regulations that are in conflict with the 
general laws). 
LC. $ 67-6512 is applicable to this case. Because a gravel pit, rock quarry or 
surface mining operation is not listed as a conditional use, and cannot be deemed a 
commercial use, a special use permit cannot be lawfdly issued under the regulations for 
the agriculturaliforestry zone of the Boundary County zoning ordinance. 
In purporting to make a property use that is not conditionally permitted eligible 
for permit as a special use, Section 1E of Chapter 7 of the zoning ordinance conflicts with 
LC. 67-6512. Therefore that section of the ordinance is void. The special use permit 
granted to Tungsten by the county board was predicated upon a section of the zoning 
ordinance which is in conflict with Idaho law. LC. 67-5279 prohibits the granting of 
permits under an ordinance in violation of statutory provision or in excess of the authority 
of the county board. Because the pennit was issued pursuant to a void ordinance the 
county board exceeded its statutory authority which is limited by LC. $67-6512. The 
Tungsten permit is prejudicial to the interests of petitioners within the meaning of LC. $ 
67-5279(4) as explained below. Even if the ordinance did not conflict with the statute, the 
use proposed by Tungsten is not a conditional use or activity permitted under the 
ordinance because the use proposed is not a commercial use or activity. 
The county board's decision to issue the Tungsten permit is therefore reversed. 
The permit was issued pursuant to a void ordinance. Alternatively, if the ordinance is not 
void the permit was issued in violation of that ordinance. Therefore, there is no occasion 
for this court to remand this matter to the county board for further hearing. 
C. Petitioner's were not prejudiced b y  lack of adequate notice prior to the hearing 
or b y  the refusal of the county board to grant a continuance. 
The Zoning Office gave petitioners 15 days' notice of the hearing to be held in 
2005 as required by Chapters 13 and 16 of the ordinance. The petitioners claim that in 
view of the county board's requirement that petitioners needed expert evidence to prove 
that the applicant failed to comply with the plan and ordinance, rather than the other way 
around, the abbreviated 15 day notice period was completely inadequate to protect 
appellants' rights. 
Petitioners contend that through its road superintendent, the county knew about 
Tungsten's intentions long before the zoning commission hearing in May 2005. They 
argue that the county did not mail notice of the application to petitioners or otherwise 
provide public notice until May 2,2005, only two weeks before the hearing. R.O.A. 
2005, p. 98. Petitioners' request for continuance of that hearing to submit expert 
evidence was denied. Petitioners' subsequent request for continuance of the county board 
hearing was denied on the basis that appellants had not obtained their expert evidence for 
the zoning hearing. They claim this is a Catch 22 and the county's hearing process 
deprived Petitioners of due process. 
Decisions by zoning commissions are "quasi-judicial" in nature. Cowan v. Board 
of Commissioners of Fremont County, Docket No. 30061,2006 Opinion No. 107,2006 
Ida. LEXIS 151 (November 29,2006,), p. 16 of Opinion, quoting fiom Chambers v. 
Kootenai County Bd. Of Comm'rs, 125 Idaho 115,118 (1994). Land use hearings that 
are quasi-judicial are subject to due process constraints. Id. Procedural due process 
requires some process to ensure the individual is not arbitrarily deprived of his rights in 
violation of the state or federal constitutions. Id. Due process issues are generally 
questions of law over which the court exercises free review. Id p. 17. 
Notice for special use permit hearings is governed by LC. 67-6512. LC. 67- 
65 12(b) provides for published notice 15 days before the hearing, and that specific notice 
be given to property owners within 300 feet of the property being considered, and to "any 
additional area that may be substantially impacted by the proposed special use" as 
determined by the zoning commission. Chapter 13, Section 4(B) and Chapter 16 of the 
zoning ordinance requires only 15 days' notice be given to property owners within 300 
feet of the land being considered. R.O.A. 2006, p. 259. 
Petitioners claim that the notice provisions in the zoning ordinance are inadequate 
to provide due process to impacted rural communities. Farm and ranch properties 
generally exceed 300 feet from all but their adjacent neighbors. They also argue: 
that in rural areas such as Porthill, the 300 foot limitation essentially restricts 
notice to all but the two or three neighboring farms. 
e the impact of a gravel pit/rock quarry operation affects the entire community, not 
just the two adjacent neighbors. Such limited notice conflicts with I.C. section 
67-65 12(b). 
with only the nearest property owners notified, special use pennits can be granted 
more or less in secret. Property owners or the county can quietly impose non- 
compatible uses without the impacted community being aware, as happened with 
the prior two special use permit applications in Porthill. 
e notice by publication is insufficient to directly notice all of the impacted property 
owners in a rural area. 
e these limitations prevent due process and fair hearings. 
In planning and zoning decisions, due process requires an opportunity to present and 
rebut evidence. Cowan v. Board of Commr 's, supra. The petitioners got notice as 
provided by law. Petitioners sought a continuance in order to obtain expert testimony. 
The county board's denial of petitioner's motion for continuance prior to the 2005 
hearing was an abuse of discretion especially because the county board placed (albeit 
unIawfidIy) upon petitioners the burden to show the permit should not be issued to 
Tungsten. Such an abuse of discretion would operate to deny a fair hearing. However, 
petitioners were not prejudiced by the denial since they were able to obtain expert 
hydrological evidence to present at the hearing in 2006. 
Petitioners do not have standing to complain about lack of notice to other landowners 
who did not get notice in a case where petitioners seek a petition for judicial review. In 
an appeal proceeding such as these petitioners cannot seek relief for others because the 
procedural rules do not permit a claim for others. Other persons claiming entitlement to 
notice would have to bring their own petition for review to this court and therein show 
their own entitlement to standing. 
D. The county board, by failing to hold Tungsten to the burden of persuasion, made 
their decision in violation of the county zoning ordinance and engaged in an 
unlawful procedure resulting in a decision which must be set aside. 
At the hearing held July 26,2005 Chairman Smith asked appellants for "any fact" 
or "documentation" that dynamiting could affect somebody's water, or if that was "just a 
fear" appellants had. C.T. 7/26/05, p.15:23-25, p.16:2-12. During that same hearing 
Chairman Smith said that Rick Dinning had a "right" to have a gravel pit. C.T. 7/26/05, 
p. 43: 1 1. Board chairman Smith also directed the staff to "come up with" conditions to 
"ease the paLn" on the community. His directive to staff was that one of the conditions 
could not be to not have a gravel pit. C.T. 7/26/05, p. 43:15-21. At the hearing on August 
8,2005 Chairman Smith said he "definitely want[ed] to approve the pit," and did not 
want "delaying tactics" or "road blocks" to '<put off the inevitable." 
The burden of persuasion is upon the applicant to show that all of the 
requirements for a special use permit aresatisfied. Fischer v. City ofKetchum, 141 Idaho 
349, 109 ~ . 3 ~ ~  1091 (Idaho 2005). The statements by board chair Smith indicate that the 
burden was upon the Gardiners. There is no indication of any change between the 2005 
and 2006 county board proceeding as regards the statements related to the proper 
allocation of the burden of persuasion. There is no indication at the hearings held in 2006 
or in the written decision of August 14,2006 that the board was holding the applicant 
Tungsten to the burden of persuasion. 
The county board failed to impose upon Tungsten the burden of persuasion 
required by the ordinance provisions concerning special use permits or conditional use 
permits. Instead the county board unlawfully placed the burden of showing that the 
permit could not be issued upon Gardiners who opposed the application of Tungsten. The 
decision of the county board has thus been rendered upon an unlawfid procedure. 
Therefore pursuant to LC. 67-5279 the decision granting the permit to Tungsten is set 
aside in it entirety. 
E. The written decision of the county board does not comply with I.C. 67-6535 
because it is not a reasoned statement that explains the criteria and standards 
considered relevant. The decision does not fairly resolve all relevant contested facts. 
The decision lacks a rationale based upon applicable ordinance and statutory 
provisions. 
Assuming that the Boundary County Zoning Ordinance authorizes a special use 
permit in an agriculWforestry zone, the board's decision must comply with LC. 67- 
6535. Under I.C. 67-6535 the issuance of a written decision regarding a local land use 
agency's approval or denial of a land use application is required. Evans v. Teton County, 
139 Idaho 71, 80 (2003). LC. 67-6535 requires the findings to be in writing explaining 
the relevant criteria and standards, the relevant contested facts, and the rationale for the 
decision based on the applicable provisions of the comprehensive plan and ordinance and 
factual information contained in the record. The decision must demonstrate that the 
agency applied the criteria prescribed by the law, and did not act arbitrarily or on an ad- 
hoc basis. Workman Family Partnership v. City of Twin Falls,.l04 Idaho 32 (1982). 
Under I.C. 67-6535, land use decisions are to be founded upon sound reason and 
practical application of recognized principles of law. In reviewing such decisions, courts 
are directed to consider the proceedmgs as a whole and to evaluate the adequacy of 
procedures and resultant decisions in the light of practical considerations, fundamental 
fairness and the essentials of reasoned decision-making. The decision of the county 
board in this case violates petitioners' rights. 
Petitioners contend that no meaningful discussion took place in the August 7 ,  
2006 hearing and that Chairman Smith simply panoted a document prepared in advance 
to bring the matter to a close. The use of a document, prepared in advance by staff, 
identifying alternative findings or choices can be useful as a checklist to guide decision 
makers. As such a properly prepared document can be a useful part of the quasi-judicial 
process, assuming relevant choices or alternatives are listed and assuming it is understood 
not to limit the decision makers but to guide them as to all the issues for decision. The 
focus should be upon the board's written decision. The transcript of the board proceeding 
has also been reviewed in detail and considered by this court. 
This court must review the record to determine whether the relevant issues were 
identified and factual conflicts determined upon the available evidence. The court's task 
is to determine whether the rationale of the written decision is supported by the proper 
evaluation of evidence and application of the $tandards provided by law. In this case both 
the written decision issued August 14,2006 and the transcript of the August 7,2006 
board proceeding show an absence of meaningful consideration of issues or resolution of 
conflicting factual information using the applicable criteria required by law. The colloquy 
between Smith and Kirby at the board proceeding of August 7,2006 does not address or 
resolve the material factual issues concerning the contentions regarding well dewatering 
and the impact of noise upon the cattle operation. The same is true as regards the impact 
upon the petitioners enjoyment of their residential rural property. There is no indication 
of a proper allocation of the burden of persuasion to contradict the statements by Chair 
Smith mentioned July 26,2005. The county board discounted the expert opinion of the 
hydrologist without basis for doing so. The county board decision briefly comments on 
dust abatement but does not fairly address the contentious issues of the adverse impact of 
the uses proposed by Tungsten upon the use and the peaceful enjoyment of petitioners' 
property. The impacts asserted relative to the cattle operation are dealt with in a 
conclusory fashion. A rationale for the conclusions relevant to a fair decision upon the 
application is not demonstrated. Thus there is no showing of a proper exercise of 
discretion. The written decision ultimately issued August 14,2006 was likewise 
conclusory and lacks evidence of considered deliberation. As previously discussed 
incorrect criteria and standards were applied. The county board's decision must be set 
aside because it violates I.C. 67-6535. 
F. Petitioners substantial rights have been prejudiced and they are entitled to relief. 
The Board's action granting the special use permit to Tungsten prejudices 
petitioners because the gravel pit operation would likely cause actual harm by disrupting 
the use and the peaceful enjoyment of petitioners property. Petitioners have also shown 
prejudice to their substantial rights to proper application of both procedural and 
substantive law. Therefore, they have shown entitlement to relief from this court as 
required by LC. 67-6259 and I.C. 67-6535. 
G. Petitioners are entitled to recovery of attorney fees and costs. 
Appellants claim entitlement to an award of attorney fees and costs pursuant to 
LC. 12-1 17 (1) which states, in part, that: 
(1) Unless otherwise provided by statute, in 
any administrative or civil judicial proceeding 
involving as adverse parties a .  . . county . . . and a 
person, the court shall award the prevailing party 
reasonable attorney's fees, witness fees and reasonable 
expenses, if the court fmds that the party against whom 
the judgment is rendered acted without a reasonable 
basis in fact or law. 
Idaho Supreme Court cases are instructive on this issue of attorney fees involving 
government action. The standard for awarding attorney fees under LC. 12-1 17 requires 
focusing on the overall action of the agency. Rincover v. State Dep 't of Fin,, 129 Idaho 
442 (1 996). 
In Reardon v. City of Burley, 140 Idaho 115 (2004), the Idaho Supreme Court 
quoted prior case law and stated: 
The purpose of LC. 5 12-1 17 is two-fold: First, it 
serves "as a deterrent to groundless arbitrary agency 
action; and [second] it provides a remedy for persons 
who have borne unfair and unjustified financial 
burdens defending against groundless charges or 
attempting to correct mistakes agencies never should 
have made. 
Under the statute, attorney fees must be awarded if the court finds in favor of the 
appellant and further finds that the county acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law. 
In Reardon attomey fees were awarded to the plaintiff on the basis that the court 
determined that the county acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law where an 
agency had no authority to take a particular action. In that case, a county ordinance was 
enacted contrary to the provisions of Idaho's Local Land Use Planning Act. The court 
noted that the county's ability to make and enforce local regulations was dependent on 
the fact that the regulations were not in conflict with the general laws of the state of 
Idaho. Idaho Const. Art. XII, 4 2. 
While the county ordinance in Reardon involved areas of city impact, the 
argument is applicable in this case because respondent Boundary County enacted Chapter 
7 Section 1(E) in December, 2001 at a point in time after the Legislature repealed similar 
language in the earlier version of LC. 67-6512. The county board is charged with 
knowledge that at time of enactment of the ordinance that the language contained therein 
had been expressly disapproved by the Legislature. In this case appellants' original 
Petition for Judicial Review, filed October 3,2005, raised this issue. The issue was 
reasserted in appellants' Petition for Judicial Review filed September 11,2006. 
In Fischer v. City of Ketchum, 141 Idaho 349 (2004), the Idaho Supreme Court 
awarded attomey fees against the City of Ketchum. The basis was that the city wholly 
ignored a provision of its ordinance requiring certification by an Idaho licensed engineer 
prior to granting of a conditional use permit. The Boundary County ordinance provisions 
of Chapter 13: Special Uses Section 4: Application Procedure: subparagraph C.4) 
require the county to find that the proposed special use will not create noise, traffic, 
odors, dust or other nuisances substantially in excess of permitted uses within the zone 
district. Idaho law clearly places the burden of persuasion upon the applicant for a 
special use permit. The failure of the county board to place the burden upon the applicant 
is prohibited conduct because the county ignored the provisions of its own zoning 
ordinance and violated state law. 
The issue of attorney fees was present in County Residents Against Pollutionfi.orn 
Septic Sludge (CRAPSS) v. Bonner County, 138 Idaho 585 (2003). The Idaho Supreme 
Court in that case upheld the decision of the District Court awarding attorney fees against 
the respondent county. The Idaho Supreme Court stated that when the county failed to 
follow its ordinance, it acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law. In that Bonner 
County case, the county arbitrarily dismissed plaintiffs' administrative appeal with no 
basis. In this case concerning the Tungsten application, the county board arbitrarily 
granted the special use permit with no basis under the ordinance for doing so. 
The court concludes that the overall action of the county board warrants this 
courts's determination that the county board acted without a reasonable basis in fact or 
law. Therefore, petitioners are entitled to attorney fees and costs on appeal. Attorney fees 
are limited to proceedings subsequent to the stipulation of the parties that each would 
bear their own fees incurred prior to April 30,2006. 
V. Conclusion 
Petitioner's request that the agency action be set aside is granted. Under the 
provisions of LC. 67-5279(3) the decision of the county board was: 
a. In violation of constitutional and statutory provisions; 
b. In excess of the statutory authority of the agency; and 
c. Made upon unlawful procedure. 
Defects in hearing procedure in some cases warrant remand for further proceedings to be 
held in confarmity with the law. However, in this case there shall be no remand. The 
county board acted either upon an invalid ordinance or failed to comply with the 
ordinance if the ordinance is considered valid. The county board acted in excess of their 
lawful authority. 
VI. Order 
The county board decision to issue the special use permit to Tungsten is set aside. 
Petitioners are entitled to an award of attorney fees and costs against the respondent. 
Done and dated this 31d day of January, 2008, with corrections made April 3, 
Senior district Judge 
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CASE NO. CV-2006-339 
Memorandum Opinion and Order 
Awarding Attorney Fees and Costs 
The court previously awarded attorney fees and costs in favor of petitioners and 
against respondent. Such award was made because the overall action of the county board 
warranted this court's determination that the county board acted without a reasonable 
basis in fact or law. Attorney fees were limited by the stipuIation of the parties that each 
would bear their own fees incurred prior to April 30,2006. The court has considered the 
briefing submitted on behalf of the parties and the arguments presented in open court. 
OBJECTIONS BY RESPONDENT 
The respondent county objects to attorney fees and costs making the following 
contentions: 
1. The amount of time for Mr. Vogel's professional services was not reasonable 
because an alternate remedy of a petition for declaratory judgment should have been 
utilized instead of assisting his clients at the county administrative level and then seeking 
judicial review of the commissioners' decision to grant the Tungsten permit. 
2. The expert fees of Kristine Uhlman are excessive and the Lexpert Research 
services referral fee is unreasonable under the circumstances of this case where 
petitioners are attorneys and could have located an expert at a lesser referral cost. 
3. The petitioners should not be given more liberal consideration by the court as 
regards discretionary fees because petitioners reduced the overall attorney fees by 
performing 200 hours of their own research for which no billing is made. 
4. Automated legal research cost of $8,114 are not recoverable under I.R.C.P. 54 
(e) (3) (K) and are unreasonable and excessive. 
DISCUSSION 
Respondents contend that petitioners should have sought the alternative of a 
petition for declaratory judgment which would have been less costly. Such contention is 
an invitation that the court speculate as to the time and effort required, as well as the 
efficacy, of alternative litigation never undertaken. The court declines to do so because 
to determine whether the county would have resisted such declaration, what defenses 
might have been employed, and the professional attorney services needed to litigate 
would be pure guesswork. There is no basis upon which this court could determine the 
outcome of litigation which was never undertaken. What about petitioners' duty to 
exhaust administrative remedies? Was the respondent willing to stay the administrative 
proceedings and proceed with declaratory judgment? Did the respondent ever consider 
petitioning for declaratory judgment? After all, the petitioner made very clear, and in a 
very timely manner, to respondent that the Boundary County Zoning Ordinance 
precluded issuance of the Tungsten permit. 
Speculation is not appropriate and the court declines to consider what might have 
been in hindsight where there is no showing that the county, at any relevant point in time, 
sought or suggested a more efficient means to resolve the case. It bears remembering that 
this courts award of costs and attorney fees was predicated upon the overall action of the 
county board which was that the county board acted without a reasonable basis in fact or 
law. The attorney fee time, rate and services performed were reasonably and necessarily 
incurred considering the factors provided in I.R.C.P. 54 (e) (3) and the sum of $5,222.00 
shall be awarded against respondent. 
The expert fees of Kristine Uhlman are awarded in the sum of $5000. This court 
recognizes the interplay of costs of right and discretionary costs as regards expert fees 
under I.R.C.P. 54 (d) (1). The expert fees claimed were necessarily incuned and were 
exceptional for reasons set forth in this court's prior Memorandum and Order. Such costs 
were actually incurred and paid, necessary, reasonable, and exceptional under the 
circumstances of the county commissioner's procedure. Justice demands that such an 
exceptional cost be assessed against respondent. The Lexperl Research Services Referral 
fee of $1250.00 has not been demonstrated to have been necessary or exceptional and 
shall not be awarded. Airfare is not an exceptional cost and is not awarded. See, Fish v. 
Smith, 131 Idaho 492, 960 P.ZdI 75 (1998) 
The court agrees with respondent that the petitioners should not be given more 
liberal consideration by the court as regards discretionary fees because petitioners 
reduced the overall attorney fees by performing 200 hours of their own research for 
which no billing is made. That however does not end the inquiry. 
Under I.R.C.P. 54 (e) (3) (K) this court must consider the reasonable cost of 
automated legal research when awarding reasonable attorney fees. Mr. Vogel's affidavit 
proves that his attorney fees were lessened by the use of automated legal research. That 
fact warrants consideration of an award of the reasonable and necessary cost of 
automated legal research as a discretionary cost not included in his attorney fees if they 
are exceptional. Such costs of automated legal research fees could be awarded under 
I.R.C.P. 54 (e) (3) (K) if performed by Mr. Vogel. That they were not performed by him 
personally should not preclude an award as an exceptional cost if the costs were 
necessary, reasonable, actually incurred and exceptional. Such costs are determined to be 
exceptional because they reduced significantly Mr. Vogel's attorney fees. Petitioners 
were able to provide competent legal research as shown by the briefing which 
demonstrates the same. The affidavits of Mr. Vogel and Ada Gardiner show the 
cooperation between the research by Gardiners and the review and finalization of briefing 
by Mr. Vogel. The research was certainly necessary in this case. The court is mindful 
that the research was accomplished by the petitioners who are lawyers and parties. Pro se 
attorneys may not collect attorney fees but that is not the circumstance here present. 
Under I.R.C.P. 54 (e)(l) paralegal fees may be awarded. Paralegals often perform 
automated legal research. The aEdavits of Mr. Vogel and Ada Gardiner show that the 
Gardiners briefing could be considered in the nature of paralegal work. That Gardiners 
can be deemed paralegals is another exceptional circumstance justifying consideration of 
an award of a reasonable and necessary cost as a discretionary cost. However, paralegal 
time cannot be awarded in this case even though Mr. Vogel's affidavit shows 200 hours 
of research by Gardiners. No time records are provided to demonstrate the 
reasonableness of the cost requested. Thus the petitioners shall not be awarded fees 
against the county for paralegal services. The question remains may the cost of 
subscribing for automated legal research be awarded as a discretionary cost. 
A reasonable cost should in fairness be awarded to petitioners for the cost of 
automated legal research. Although performed by Gardiners and not by Mr. Vogel such 
cost is determined by this court to be reasonable and necessary. The cost should be 
awarded considering the combined purposes and effect of I.R.C.P. 54 (e)(l) and I.R.C.P. 
54 (e) (3) (K). Incurring that cost reduced the attorney fees of Mr. Vogel. The 
circumstance of the performance of legal research by Gardiners in this case is ruled 
exceptional as stated above. However, the subscription costs set forth in the affidavit of 
Ada Gardiner are not shown to be reasonable because the affidavit and associated billings 
are not sufficiently detailed as regards the detail of issues researched. The monthly 
subscription cost by itself is not a reasonable basis for an award because it is a monthly 
cost without regard to the requirements of this case. A reasonable award should be made 
based upon the need to focus primarily upon existing Idaho statutes, case law and the 
relevant ordinances of Boundary County. Idaho statutory and case law existed on all 
aspects of this case. This court is experienced with automated legal research and utilizes 
the same in performing duties as a senior district judge. I have experience with both 
Casemaker provided as a result of Idaho State Bar Membership and with Westlaw. It is 
this judge's practice to utilize automated legal research so as not to burden the law clerks 
of the judges over whose cases I preside. I know from personal experience the value, 
efficiency, speed and cost of automated legal research. An award of $2000 for the cost to 
access automated legal research is appropriate as a discretionary cost in this case. The 
briefing submitted on behalf of petitioners shows excellent legal research which was of 
invaluable assistance to the court. The court emphasizes that no award is made for any 
work performed by Gardiners as either attorneys or paralegals as no such professional 
fees are claimed nor sufficiently detailed. Only the cost of accessing automated legal 
research is awarded. 
CONCLUSION 
Petitioner's request for attorney fees and costs should be awarded as follows: 
Attorney fees: $5200.00 
Costs as a matter of Right $ 82.00 
Costs under Appellate Rule 40(b) $302.25 
Discretionary Costs 
Expert fees $5000.00 
Automated Legal Research $2000.00 
TOTAL $12,584.25 
ORDER 
Petitioners are entitled to an award of attorney fees and costs against the 
respondent as set forth above. 
IT IS SO ORDERED at Bonners Ferry this 15th day of April, 2008. 
A 
~er%or district Judge 
Certif~cate of Delivery 
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Court is fully advised; therefore, good cause appearing, 
IT HEREBY IS ORDERED that Respondents' REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE be, 
and hereby is, GRANTED and this Court shall take JUDICIAL NOTICE of the following 
chapters of the Boundary County, Idaho Zoning and Subdivision Ordinance 99-06, as amended 
through March, 2006, copies of which accompanied this Request as Exhibits 1 and 2, and shall 
be placed in this Record on Appeal as EXHIBITS: 
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